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t Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. I received invaluable assist-
ance while writing this article from Lucinda E. Jesson and from the faculty, staff, and 
students of William Mitchell College of Law. In particular, I would like to thank Greg 
Reigel, Mara Pehkonen, Maureen Kelly, Keith Rinta, and Melissa Haley for their re-
search and analysis of many of the issues in this article. I would never have written this 
article, however, if it had not been for two lawyers I worked with in private practice. 
The morning of my first day as a lawyer, Wayne Faris and Jerome Miranowski asked me 
to find out "what happens at trial after a Pierringersettlement." Little did they know, I 
would still be working on my answers ten years later. 
1. Rambaum v. Swisher, 435 N.W.2d 19, 22 (Minn. 1989). 
1 
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I. INTRODUCfION 
For over thirty years now, Pierringer releases have been part of 
the ebb and flow of civil litigation. In October of 1963, the Wis-
consin Supreme Court decided the case of Pierringer v. Hoger. 2 
Fifteen years later, in 1978, the Minnesota Supreme Court offi-
cially approved the use of Pierringer releases in Minnesota.3 To-
day, the Pierringer release remains a critically important part of 
modern tort litigation. 
The Pierringerrelease is important because it permits a plaintiff 
who has sued several defendants to settle with one and preserve 
its claims against the rest. The plaintiff can then proceed to trial 
against the remaining defendants. At the end of trial, the jury 
will apportion fault among all the parties, including the settling 
defendants. The plaintiff is entitled to recover the percentage of 
damages the jury has allocated to the nonsettling defendants.4 
The plaintiff is not entitled, however, to any further recovery 
from the settling defendants,5 nor may the nonsettling defend-
ants seek contribution from the settling defendants.6 
2. 124 N.W.2d 106 (Wis. 1963). 
3. Frey v. Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d 918, 922 (Minn. 1978). 
4. As a practical matter, Pierringer releases are most commonly used in products 
liability and other personal injury cases involving multiple defendants. Pierringer re-
leases may be used, however, in any case in which the jury apportions fault among the 
parties. See, e.g., Bougie v. Sibley Manor, 504 N.W.2d 493,498 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) 
(considering whether a Pierringer release of a fellow employee in a sexual harassment 
action required reduction of the judgment against the nonsettling defendants); City of 
Menomonie v. Evensen Dodge, Inc., 471 N.W.2d 513, 516 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (al-
lowing use of a Pierringer release in a negligence case for breach of fiduciary duty). In 
Wisconsin, use of the Pierringer release is restricted to cases involving joint tortfeasors, 
and may not be used if one defendant is sued in tort and the other in contract. Eden 
Stone Co. v. Oakfield Stone Co., 479 N.W.2d 557, 563-64 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991). 
Minnesota recognizes a more expansive use of Pierringer releases. Minnesota courts 
have, for example, approved Pierringerreleases in cases involving construction contracts, 
Barr/Nelson, Inc. v. Tonto's, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 46 (Minn. 1983); claims of fraudulent 
conveyance, In re: Hancock-Nelson Mercantile Co., 95 B.R. 982, 1001-02 (Bankr. D. 
Minn. 1989); and arbitration of claims relating to securities law violations, Stassen v. 
Tschida, No. C2-91-2070, 1992 WL 67536 (Minn. Ct. App. April 7, 1992). 
5. See, e.g., Shantz v. Richview, Inc., 311 N.W.2d 155 (Minn. 1980) (allowing set-
tling defendant to settle without fear of future suit). Conversely, the settling defendant 
cannot request return of the settlement proceeds if the jury finds the plaintiff suffered 
no compensable damages. See, e.g., Rambaum, 435 N.W.2d at 22 (holding that settling 
tortfeasors are dismissed with pr~udice from the lawsuit and any possible crossclaims). 
See part IIA for a discussion of the problems associated with allocation of damages. 
6. Under the terms of a Pierringer release, the plaintiff must indemnify the settling 
defendants against any claims of contribution. See, e.g., Pierringer, 124 N.W.2d at 108; 
John E. Simonett (now Justice), Release of joint Tortfeasors: Use of the Pierringer Release in 
Minnesota, 3 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1,3 (1977). 
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Courts welcomed the Pierringer release as a principled way to 
encourage settlement in complicated multi-party litigation.7 
Here, at last, was a release that "correctly" implemented the prin-
ciples of the tort recovery system without suffering from the dis-
advantages of earlier forms of settlement such as the Mary Carter 
releases or the covenant not to sue.9 
When first adopted, the Pierringer release seemed to promise 
something for everyone. The Pierringer release promised the 
plaintiff certainty of a partial recovery and an opportunity to fi-
nance further litigation directed toward proving the remaining 
defendants' fault. For the settling defendant, the Pierringer re-
lease promised the certainty of absolute repose, freeing the set-
tling defendant from worry over any future claims for 
contribution. The Pierringer release offered a promise of fairness 
to the nonsettling defendant: Be assured that, no matter what 
the outcome of trial, you will pay no more than your "fair share" 
of the verdict. 10 
This last Pierringer promise, an assurance of a fair result to the 
nonsettling defendant, was hardly a trifle. The Pierringer release 
offered a promise that alternative forms of releases, because of 
the possibility of collusion or improper allocation of fault, were 
7. See, e.g., Rambaum, 435 N.W.2d at 23 (accepting the results of Pierringerreleases 
due to their strong encouragement of settlement). 
8. A Mary Carter release essentially is a settlement agreement in which the settling 
defendant guarantees the plaintiff a certain recovery, promises to defend itself during 
the litigation and at trial, and receives a "rebate" on its settlement payment for any 
increase in the plaintiffs recovery against the nonsettling defendant. Booth v. Mary 
Carter Paint Co., 202 So.2d 8, 10-11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967), uverruled by Ward v. 
Ochoa, 284 So.2d 385 (Fla. 1973). The governing notion ofthe Mary Carter settlement 
is that the settling defendant has an incentive to increase the liability of the nonsettling 
defendant and, thus, increase the plaintiff's damage award. Mary Carter agreements 
often provide that the plaintiff will pay the settling defendant a percentage of its recov-
ery against the nonsettling defendants. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 
S.W.2d 855, 858 (Tex. 1977) (finding the Mary Carter settlement to be a loan receipt-
type agreement). For additional discussion of Mary Carter agreements, see part I.D. 
9. A covenant not to sue is not really a release, but rather is simply an agreement 
by the plaintiff not to pursue a cause of action. See infra notes 17 & 18 and accompany-
ing text. In most jurisdictions, at the time Pierringer releases were created, a covenant 
not to sue bought the settling defendant little peace. Even though the plaintiff had 
contracted not to pursue its cause, the settling defendant still faced the possibility of 
defending the nonsettling defendant's contribution claim. See, e.g., Pierringer, 124 
N.W.2d at 109. 
10. See, e.g., Frey, 269 N.W.2d at 922 ("[T]he nonsettling defendant is relieved from 
paying more than his fair share of the verdict .... "); Simonett, supra note 6, at 9 (" [T] he 
non-settling tortfeasor had no cause to complain, for after all he was relieved from 
paying any more than what his share might prove to be."). 
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unable to make. Unfortunately, largely because of the impact 
Pierringer settlements have on litigation and trial, it is a promise 
the Pierringer release has too often failed to keep. 
This article explores why this promise has been broken. Part 
II reviews how the need for a release that permitted piecemeal 
settlements in comparative fault cases led to the development 
and adoption of Pierringer releases in Wisconsin and Minnesota. 
Part III explores two different sets of problems: first, the appel-
late definition and modification of how Pierringer settlements al-
locate fault; and second, how Pierringer releases can change the 
conduct of discovery and trial, and the impact these changes can 
have on the apportionment of fault. This second set of 
problems has received scant attention from the appellate courts, 
and Part IV discusses possible explanations for this .. Finally, Part 
V proposes solutions to some of the problems Pierringer releases 
have created. 
II. AND You MAY FIND YOURSELF IN A BEAUTIFUL HOUSE ... 11 
Judges and lawyers like settlements. Lawyers like them be-
cause they are certain. Judges like them because they are effi-
cient. Efficiency is critical because we do not have enough 
judges, courtrooms, or days in the week to try even half of the 
civil suits filed. 12 Settlement of complicated multi-defendant 
civil litigation is particularly valuable, because complicated civil 
trials can consume enormous amounts ofajudge's time and can 
be expensive for the parties. However, settling multi-defendant 
civil litigation can be especially difficult. Different defendants 
have different tolerances for risk, and some defendants are sim-
ply far less willing to settle than others. Consequently, our civil 
litigation system needs a mechanism that permits defendant-by-
defendant, "piecemeal" settlement of multi-defendant civil 
lawsuits. 
11. TALKING HEADS, Once in a Lifetime, on STOP MAKING SENSE (Sire Records 1984). 
12. At present, over 90 percent of civil suits settle prior to judgment. Figures for 
the 1960s and 1970s are similar. See, e.g., 1990 Director of the Admin. Off. of the U.S. Courts 
Ann. Report in REp. OF THE PROC. OF THEJUD. CoNF. OF THE U.S., 1990. Offederal cases 
terminated during the twelve month period ending June 30, 1990, only 4.3 percent 
reached trial. Only 9.0 percent of terminated torts cases reached trial. [d. at 153. Com-
parison of statistics for total civil cases terminated and total civil trials for the years 1963 
to 1978 indicates that between 10.7 percent and 5.7 percent of civil cases reached trial. 
1978 Director of the Admin. Off. of the u.s. Courts Ann. Report in REp. OF THE PROC. OF THE 
JUD. CoNF. OF THE U.S., 1978 at 177,264. 
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This was as true thirty years ago as it is today. Thirty years ago, 
however, two related sets of legal problems made it much more 
difficult to settle multi-defendant civil suits. First, though judges 
have always favored settlements, until quite recently, tort law ac-
tually discouraged piecemeal, defendant-by-defendant settle-
ment. In the 1960s and early 1970s, the doctrines governing 
release of defendants and contribution among defendants made 
piecemeal settlements perilous. Second, prior to Picrringer re-
leases, the mechanisms available for partial settlement created a 
number of other difficulties for plaintiffs and defendants. Pier-
ringer releases developed in response to these two related sets of 
problems. 
A. The Piecemeal Settlement Problem 
In 1962, the year before the decision in Picrringer, settlement 
of multi-defendant litigation presented serious legal complica-
tions. On one hand, a plaintiff contemplating settlement with 
one of several defendants faced the possibility that release of the 
one defendant would also extinguish all claims against the non-
settling defendants. 13 On the other hand, in jurisdictions which 
permitted contribution among joint tortfeasors,14 a settling de-
fendant faced the possibility of post-settlement contribution 
13. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 49, at 
332 & nn.6 & 7 (5th ed. 1984). Prosser states "[u]ntil quite recent decades, most of the 
courts continued to hold that a release to one of two concurrent tortfeasors was a com-
plete surrender of any cause of action against the other, and a bar to any suit against 
the other, without regard to the sufficiency of the compensation actually received." [d. 
(footnotes omitted). Minnesota adhered to this rule as late as 1970. See, e.g., Holmgren 
v. Heisick, 287 Minn. 386, 391, 178 N.W.2d 854, 858 (1970) (holding that the release of 
one joint tortfeasor releases any others). 
Today, the general rule in Minnesota is that "the release of one alleged tortfeasor 
will release all others if the settlement agreement manifests such an intent, or if the 
plaintiff received full compensation in law or in fact for damages sought against the 
remaining tortfeasors. Bixler by Bixler v. J.C. Penney Co., 376 N.W.2d 209, 214-15 
(Minn. 1985) (citing Luxenburg v. Can-Tex Industries, 257 N.W.2d 804, 807-08 (Minn. 
1977». 
14. Few jurisdictions permitted contribution among joint tortfeasors in the 1960s. 
"The great majority of our courts ... refused to permit contribution even where in-
dependent, although concurrent, negligence had contributed to a single result. Until 
the 1970's-for a period of more than a century-only nine American jurisdictions 
came to the contrary conclusion, allowing contribution without legislation." KEETON, 
supra note 12, § 50, at 337 & nn.l1 & 12. Wisconsin and Minnesota were among that 
minority of nine jurisdictions permitting contribution. See, e.g., Skaja v. Andrews Hotel 
Co., 281 Minn. 417,420, 161 N.W.2d 657, 660 (1968) (holding that where common 
liability exists contribution is due as of right); Mitchell v. Raymond, 195 N.W. 855,859 
(Wis. 1923) (holding that joint liability requires contribution). 
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claims made by the nonsettling defendants. I5 In essence, the law 
in the 1960s and early 1970s worked to discourage parties from 
settlement. 
At that time, a plaintiff was reluctant to grant a release that 
could be construed as a complete satisfaction of any part of a 
cause of action, for fear it would release all joint tortfeasors. A 
defendant, on the other hand, was loathe to settle absent a com-
plete release, for fear that anything less would permit the re-
maining defendants to seek contribution for a future judgment. 
Although lawyers like settlement because it offers certainty, set-
tlement of multi-defendant litigation in the early 1960s offered 
little certainty to either plaintiffs or defendants. 
B. Problems of Allocation: Pre-Pierringer Settlement 
The piecemeal settlement problem was not insoluble, but the 
solutions available to litigants in most jurisdictions in the 1960s 
and early 1970s were not particularly satisfying. The two most 
common forms of partial settlement were the covenant not to 
sue and the infamous Mary Carter release. In addition, in the 
early 1960s, litigants in Wisconsin and a few other jurisdictions 
could also settle using pro rata releases. I6 However, each of these 
alternatives presented difficult problems for litigants and the 
courts. The acceptance of Pierringer releases has largely been a 
response to the problems created by these other forms of re-
lease, particularly the Mary Carter agreement. 
1. Covenants Not to Sue: The Problem of Uncertainty 
A covenant not to sue is not really a release. It is simply a 
plaintiff's agreement not to pursue a cause of action against a 
particular defendant. At the time of settlement, the plaintiff ex-
ecutes a covenant to refrain from suing the settling defendant. 
If the plaintiff already sued the defendant, the plaintiff can 
15. This issue was particularly problematic in pre-Pieninger Wisconsin. At the time 
Pieninger was decided, Wisconsin law permitted contribution among joint tortfeasors, 
and settling defendants were subject to contribution if the plaintiff reserved its rights to 
the full cause of action against the nonsettling defendant. Pierringer, 124 N.W.2d at 109. 
"[W]e construed a release providing for complete discharge of the settling tort-feasor 
with a reservation of rights of the full cause of action against the nonsettling tort-feasor 
to be in the nature of a covenant not to sue and held the nonsettling tort-feasor's right 
to contribution was not affected." [d. (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Conti-
nental Casualty Co., 59 N.W.2d 425 (1953». 
16. See infra note 21 and accompanying text. 
HeinOnline -- 20 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 8 1994
8 WILUAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20 
promise not to collect any portion of the judgment from the set-
tling defendant. Tort doctrines governing joint and several lia-
bility gave a plaintiff the discretion necessary to make this 
promise. A victorious plaintiff was' free to collect the judgment 
from any joint tortfeasor it chose.I 7 Consequently, a plaintiff 
could promise not to collect any part of a judgment from a set-
tling defendant. 
Since a covenant not to sue is not a complete release, it does 
not protect a settling defendant from future contribution claims. 
In jurisdictions such as Minnesota and Wisconsin, where contri-
bution among tortfeasors was permitted, plaintiffs could not 
promise settling defendants that the covenant not to sue would 
protect them from future contribution actions. IS At best, the 
covenant not to sue permitted a settling defendant to purchase 
only a partial and uneasy peace. 
2. Partial Releases: The Problem of Misallocation 
Wisconsin, unlike most other jurisdictions in the early 1960s, 
had solved some of the common law problems plaguing settle-
ment of multi-defendant litigation. Joint tortfeasors had the 
right to seek contribution from one another, but Wisconsin law 
provided for two forms of release that protected a settling de-
fendant from future claims of contribution: the pro tanto and pro 
rata releases. 
In the late nineteenth century, Wisconsin had set aside the 
common law rule that the release of one joint tortfeasor released 
all joint tortfeasors, and instead provided that settlement agree-
ments should be construed according to the intent of the par-
ties. I9 Consequently, a plaintiff in Wisconsin had the option of 
settling with one joint tortfeasor and pursuing the nonsettling 
joint tortfeasors for the remainder of the claim. 
17, See WILLIAM L PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 46, at 271 (3d ed, 
1964); see also Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119, 126, 64 N.W.2d 159, 164 (1954) (stat-
ing that receipt of part of a judgment from one tortfeasor does not relieve any other 
tortfeasor from liability). 
18. For an example of more modem use of the covenant not to sue, see Faber v. 
Roelofs, 298 Minn. 16, 212 N.W.2d 856 (1973). In Faber, the plaintiff and settling de-
fendant did not disclose the covenant until the close of evidence at trial. The court 
stated its disapproval of secret settlements, but held that the settling defendant's pres-
ence at trial was not improper because the settling defendant was still subject to the 
cross-claims of the other defendants. [d. at 861. 
19. Ellis v. Essau, 6 N.W. 518, 520 (Wis. 1880). 
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Exactly what constituted "the remainder of the claim" de-
pended on which of two forms of release the Wisconsin plaintiff 
chose, the pro tanto release or the pro rata release.20 A plaintiff 
opting for a pro tanto release would settle with one defendant, 
and then proceed to trial against the remaining defendants. If 
the plaintiff recovered a verdict against the nonsettling defend-
ants, the trial judge would reduce the amount of the verdict by 
the amount of the settlement.21 A pro rata release allowed the 
plaintiff to settle with one of two defendants, and proceed to 
trial against the remaining defendant. The trial judge would re-
duce the amount of any verdict for damages by the settling de-
fendant's pro rata share, which, in this case, is one-half.22 
From the settling defendant's perspective, both of these alter-
natives were preferable to the covenant not to sue, because both 
provided the settling defendant protection from future claims of 
contribution. From the perspective of the plaintiff and nonset-
tling defendants in Wisconsin in 1962, however, both forms of 
settlement posed serious problems. Both the pro tanto and pro 
rata settlements created a risk of misallocation. 
20. For a complete explanation of the development of Wisconsin law governing 
settlements and releases prior to Pierringer v. Hoger, see Harrold J. McComas, Trrrt Re-
leases in Wisconsin, 49 MARQ. L. REv. 533 (1965-66). Both the pro tanto and the pro rata 
releases were creatures of the common law. Ellis, 6 N.W. at 520-22; Heimbach v. Hagen, 
83 N.W.2d 710 (Wis. 1957). Prior to the decision in Pierringer, Wisconsin had adopted 
the Uniform Joint Obligations Act. UNIF. JOINT OBLIGATIONS Aer, ch. 235, 1927 Wis. 
Laws 273 (codified as amended at WIS. STAT. § 113 (West 1992». The bench and bar in 
Wisconsin, however, found it difficult to fit the commonly used forms of settlem"ent 
release into the statutory categories. See McComas, supra, at 535-36; see, e.g., Pierringer, 
124 N.W.2d at 111 (stating that section 113 of the Wisconsin statutes applies to a tort 
release only when the statute is explicitly referred to or when the parties' intent cannot 
clearly be determined); Heimbach, 83 N.W.2d at 713 (declining to determine whether to 
apply section 113 of the Wisconsin statutes because the parties' intent was clear). 
21. Ellis, 6 N.W. at 521. The settlement in Ellis was a release under seal, and the 
court could easily have construed the release as either a general release of all the 
tortfeasors or, alternatively, a covenant not to sue. The Ellis court ruled that the parties 
intended neither result and that the intent of the parties should govern construction of 
the release. [d. at 520. The court held that the release did not discharge the nonset-
tling defendants, but did protect the settling defendant from future claims of contribu-
tion. [d. at 524. The amount of the plaintiff's eventual verdict, if any, would be 
reduced by the amount of the settlement. [d. at 521. Voila! a pro tanto release was 
created. 
22. Heimbach, 83 N.W.2d at 712-13. The release in Heimbach simply provided that 
the settlement amount satisfied one-half of the plaintiff's claim, and that the settling 
defendant was released from any future claims of contribution. [d. The court upheld 
the release because the nonsettling defendant would be required to pay only one-half 
of the verdict, or that defendant's fair share. [d. at 713. 
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a. Pro tanto Problems of Misallocation 
Suppose a plaintiff entered a pro tanto settlement with a de-
fendant for $10,000, and then proceeded to trial against the re-
maining defendant. If the jury returned a verdict of $20,000, 
then all parties could look at the settlement and believe justice 
had been done. The plaintiff would recover $20,000, half from 
each of the joint tortfeasors. 
However, if the verdict moves very far from that $20,000 it be-
comes harder to find justice. For example, if the nonsettling de-
fendant is found to be negligent and the verdict is only $10,000, 
then the nonsettling defendant will owe the plaintiff nothing. 
On the other hand, if the verdict is $100,000, then the nonset-
tling defendant will owe the plaintiff $90,000.23 In both situa-
tions, the judgment against the nonsettling defendant bears no 
relation to that defendant's "fair share" of negligence. Conse-
quently, the pro tanto release has created a misallocation of 
damages.24 
b. Pro rata Problems of Misallocation 
As with the pro tanto settlement, the problem of misallocation 
also haunts the pro rata settlement. Prior to the development of 
23. In some jurisdictions, a pro tanto release did not extinguish a nonsettling de-
fendant's right of contribution. This was, for example, the original rule under the 
Unif. Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act § 5 (1939) historical note, 12 U.L.A. 58 
(1975); see also PROSSER, supra note 16, § 47, at 277-78. Permitting contribution against 
the settling defendant eliminates half of the problem because the nonsettling defend-
ant will have the right to seek contribution from the settling defendant for any amount 
the nonsettling defendant has paid in excess of its "fair share." Eliminating the misallo-
cation problem, however, revives the uncertainty problem. Unless the pro tanto release 
extinguishes the right of contribution, it gives the settling defendant no more peace 
than a covenant not to sue. Largely for this reason, the 1955 revision to the Uniform 
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act adopted the alternative approach and discharged 
a settling tortfeasor from liability for future contribution. UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG 
TORTFEASoRS ACT § 4(b) commissioner's comment, 12 U.L.A. 99-100 (1975). 
24. There is an implicit assumption here that merits further discussion. The pro 
tanto release misallocates fault if we accept the notion that the law of equal contribution 
between tortfeasors is a "proper" allocation of fault This notion certainly has been 
open to dispute, and the dispute about the fairness of pro rata contribution was part of 
the impetus in the development of comparative fault. See supra notes 40-41 for a dis-
cussion of comparative fault in Minnesota. It seems easier to assert that ajury's alloca-
tion of individual percentage shares of comparative fault is the "proper" allocation of 
fault, but that assertion also contains implicit assumptions that invite controversy. Fine-
tuning comparative fault, however, is mercifully beyond the scope of this article. For 
purposes of this discussion, fair allocation of fault is defined as an al1ocation of fault 
that closely matches the apportionment a jury would have made had all parties been 
present at trial to litigate their fault. 
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comparative fault and contribution according to comparative al-
location, the pro rata release seemed an adequate solution to the 
piecemeal settlement problem. With the advent of comparative 
fault, however, the pro rata release potentially created misalloca-
tion problems similar to those of the pro tanto release. 
Suppose a plaintiff enters a pro rata settlement with one of two 
defendants. The pro rata allocation of damages seems fair as 
long as the jury equally allocates fault to each defendant. If the 
fault allocation moves from equipoise, however, then the pro rata 
settlement has misallocated damages. This occurs because the 
plaintiff has released one-half of its claim in the pro rata settle-
ment. The pro rata release effectively capped the nonsettling de-
fendant's share of damages at one-half of the plaintiff's total 
damages.25 If, for example, the jury then allocated ninety per-
cent of fault to the nonsettling defendant, the plaintiff would be 
undercompensated.26 As a matter of settlement strategy, a plain-
tiff in an era of comparative fault would be foolish to enter a pro 
rata settlement with the defendant the plaintiff believes to be 
least at fault. 
Pro rata and pro tanto settlements may have presented better 
solutions to the piecemeal settlement problem than covenants 
not to sue. Nonetheless, these forms of release were partial solu-
tions at best. The problem of misallocation remained, and was 
sufficiently severe so as to undermine the usefulness of both the 
pro tanto and pro rata settlement in an era of comparative fault. 
Comparative fault is the source of the Pierringer release; the need 
for the Pierringer release flows from that source. 
C. Pierringer Settlements: A Solution to the Allocation Problem? 
1. Wisconsin Invents the Pierringer Settlement 
The trial bench and bar were quick to welcome the Pierringer 
release because it presented an elegant solution to the problem 
of piecemeal settlement in multi-party litigation. The original 
"Pierringer release" grew out of an attempt to resolve a particu-
larly complicated and protracted piece of litigation. On Novem-
25. The nonsettling defendant's share would be capped at one-third if there are 
three defendants, one·fourth if there are four, and so on. 
26. The same caveat concerning a proper allocation of fault offered above is of-
fered here. See supra note 24. The plaintiff is undercompensated only if we accept the 
notion that the jury's allocation of fault is the "proper," "correct," or "fair" allocation of 
fault. 
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ber 1, 1957, Loschel Pierringer, Burton Hoger, and William 
Bormann were working near a gas-fired boiler at Schmitz Ready 
Mix, Inc., a concrete plant in Port Washington, Wisconsin. 
Hoger, Bormann, and Pierringer were all injured in an explo-
sion caused when part of the gas piping was disconnected in an 
attempt to bleed the gas line and ignite the boiler.27 
In the middle of 1958, Pierringer, Hoger, and Bormann each 
brought suit against Schmitz Ready Mix, Milwaukee Gas Light 
Company and several other defendants. Milwaukee Gas cross-
complained, alleging that Mathias Greisch improperly installed a 
pressure regulator, causing the explosion. Three years of inten-
sive litigation followed, but by 1962, Mr. Pierringer and the two 
other plaintiffs were apparently nearing a settlement with all the 
defendants except Greisch.28 
While the parties in Pierringerwere negotiating settlement, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court decided Bielski v. Shuiz.e,29 which 
changed Wisconsin's common law doctrine governing contribu-
tion. Prior to Bielski, Wisconsin followed a rule that "equity was 
equality"; contribution among joint tortfeasors was shared on an 
equal pro rata basis. 30 Bielski changed that. Now defendants were 
liable for contribution based on the jury-apportioned percent-
age of their comparative negligence.31 Bielski invited a new form 
of settlement that would reflect this new law of contribution.32 
Pierringer was the first of these new settlements. 
27. Pierringer v. Hoger, 124 N.W.2d 106, 107 (Wis. 1963). Since the court's state-
ment of facts is unfortunately quite terse, see also Brief of Burton E. Hoger and William 
Bormann, Respondents at 3, Pierringer v. Hoger, 124 N.W.2d 106 (Wis. 1963) (No. 32); 
Brief of Defendant-Respondent Milwaukee Gas Light Company at 4, Pierringer (Nos. 31 
and 32); see also McComas, supra note 19. Harrold McComas, of then Foley, Sammond 
& Lardner, was one of the principal architects of the release. He represented the Mil-
waukee Gas Light Company, and his article is a first-hand account of the development 
of that first Pierringer release, complete with a copy of the text of the original release. 
28. See McComas, supra note 20, at 534. Mr. McComas's description of the litiga-
tion sounds strikingly modern: "More than three years had been consumed following 
commencement of the actions in multitudinous pleadings, examinations, depositions, 
motions, and other procedures which are largely unavoidable when multiple parties are 
involved in claims resulting from such an intricate industrial occurrence." [d. 
29. 114 N.W.2d 105 (Wis. 1962). 
30. [d. at 108 (citing Estate of Ryan, 147 N.w. 993 (Wis. 1914)). 
31. Bielski, 114 N.W.2d at 107. For a discussion of the impact the Bielski decision 
had on the settlement negotiations in Pierringer, see McComas, supra note 20, at 534-40. 
32. Bielski, 114 N.W.2d at 111. In response to the defendant's argument that aboli-
tion of the common law rule of equal, pro rata contribution would complicate the law of 
settlements and releases, the Bielski court stated: 
In order for a plaintiff to give a release and covenant which will protect the 
settling tortfeasor from a claim of contribution, the plaintiff must agree to 
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On May 15, 1962, Loschel Pierringer signed the first release, 
settling his claims against all defendants except Mathias 
Greisch.33 The release contained four critical elements: 
1. A complete release of the Milwaukee Gas Light Company 
and the other settling defendants; 
2. A discharge of the claim to the extent of the "portions or 
fractions or percentages of causal negligence" of the set-
tling defendants, as later determined by the jury at trial; 
3. A reservation of the claim against the remaining, nonset-
tling defendant; and, 
4. An indemnification of the settling defendants against any 
future claims of contribution.34 
With these four elegant strokes, the Pieninger release had seem-
ingly solved the piecemeal settlement problem. The plaintiff 
preserved his cause of action against the nonsettling defendant. 
The settling defendants gained absolute repose, free of worry 
from future claims of contribution. In the event that contribu-
tion claims were made, the settling defendants could look to the 
plaintiff for indemnification. 
Best of all, the Pieninger release did not seem to create 
problems of misallocation, as had pro rata and pro tanto settle-
ments. The plaintiff discharged only part of his claim-that per-
centage portion of fault that the jury would later allocate to the 
settling defendants. This provision answered the invitation ex-
tended in Bielski. The jury would allocate a percentage of fault 
to each of the negligent parties, whether they had settled out or 
not. There could be no problem of misallocation, so it seemed, 
because the nonsettling defendant, Greisch, would be held lia-
ble for that exact portion of damages equal to his percentage of 
jury-allocated fault, no more and no less. 
[d. 
satisfY such percentage of the judgment he ultimately recovers as the settling 
tortfeasor's causal negligence is detennined to be of all the causal negligence 
of all the co-tortfeasors. 
33. For a text of that first release, see McComas, supra note 20, at 533, 540-42. Mr. 
Griesch, the only remaining defendant, appealed the trial court's summary judgment 
dismissing the settling defendants from the action. The supreme court affinned the 
summary judgment, and ruled that the releases effectively precluded the nonsettling 
defendant from seeking contribution from the settling defendants. The court held that 
the plaintiff could proceed to trial against the remaining defendant and recover the 
percentage of negligence, if any, the jury assessed against that defendant. Pierringer v. 
Hoger, 124 N.W.2d 106, 112 (Wis. 1963). 
34. See McComas, supra note 20, at 540-42. 
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On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court enforced the re-
lease and held that it barred the nonsettling defendant's right to 
contribution.35 Consistent with the decision in Bielski and with 
the intent of the release, the court ruled that the jury should 
consider the negligence of all the parties, including the settling 
defendants.36 Greisch, the nonsettling defendant, would be lia-
ble for only that portion of the judgment equal to his percentage 
of negligence.37 Significantly, the Wisconsin court also ruled 
that the settling defendants need not remain active participants 
at trial. Greisch argued that if the settling defendants did not 
participate at trial, "a proper issue of causal negligence could 
not be submitted to the trier of the fact."38 The court rejected 
this argument, holding that: 
The issue between the plaintiff and the nonsetding defendant 
... is the percentage of causal negligence, if any, of the non-
settling defendant, but such percentage of negligence can 
only be determined by a proper allocation of all the causal 
negligence, if any, of all the joint tortfeasors and of the plain-
tiff if contributory negligence is involved. The determination 
of this issue between the plaintiff and the nonsetding defend-
ant does not require the setding defendants to remain parties 
because the allocation, if any, of the causal negligence to the settling 
tortfeasors is merely a part of the mechanics by which the percentage of 
causal negligence of the nonsettling tortfeasor is determined. 39 
As argued in the following section, determining the negli-
gence of a settling defendant involves more than mere "mechan-
ics," but this might have seemed a minor quibble in 1963. In 
effect the Pierringer court said "Go home, settling defendants! 
Your part here is over." In 1963, piecemeal settlement was a vex-
ing problem for lawyers. In fact, Prosser said piecemeal settle-
ment "has perhaps given more difficulty than any other 
35. Pierringer. 124 N.W.2d at 111. 
36. As the Pierringer court stated: "[H] ere. the failure to include in the apportion-
ment question the causal negligence of the settling respondents would because of the 
releases necessarily be prejudicial to the nonsettling appellant." [d. at 112. 
37. The court stated in this regard: 
Upon the trial the release should be given immediate effect. as it is for contri-
bution purposes. and the judgment. if any. against the nonsettling defendant 
should only be for that percentage of negligence allocated to him by the find-
ings or the verdict. The claim for the balance has been satisfied by the plain-
tiff and there is no point in going through the circuity of ordering a judgment 
for a larger amount and requiring the plaintiff to satisi)' it. 
[d. at 112. 
38. [d. at Ill. 
39. Pierringer. 124 N.W.2d at 111-12 (emphasis added). 
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problem."40 Following the decision in Pierringer, it must have 
seemed that this difficult problem had finally been laid to rest. 
2. Today Wisconsin, Tomorrow Minnesota: Adoption of 
Pierringer Releases Outside Wisconsin 
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, state courts wrestled 
with comparative fault and the piecemeal settlement problem. 
As these states adopted comparative fault in one form or an-
other, Pierringer-style solutions to the piecemeal settlement prob-
lem became increasingly viableY Minnesota adopted 
comparative fault in 1969,42 and, shortly thereafter, lawyers in 
Minnesota began using Pierringer settlements.43 
In 1977, John Simonett (now Justice) wrote an article about 
the use of Pierringer releases in Minnesota, correctly predicting 
40. KEETON, supra note 12, § 47, at 277 (3d ed. 1964). 
4l. The three principal jurisdictions using Pierringl1Yreleases are Wisconsin, Minne-
sota, and North Dakota. Maine initially approved limited use of Pierringer releases, but 
in the last ten years has drastically narrowed even that limited use. See part III.B. In 
other jurisdictions, courts have adopted types of releases that are similar to Pierringl1Y 
releases, and have used Minnesota and Wisconsin law to guide their interpretations of 
their own law. See, e.g., Montana ex reL Deere & Co. v. District Court of Fifth Judicial 
Dist. ex rel. Beaverhead County, 730 P.2d 396, 409 (Mont. 1986) (Gulbrandson,J., con-
curring and dissenting) (arguing Montana should follow Wisconsin, Minnesota and 
North Dakota in adopting the percent credit rule with respect to its comparative fault 
statute); Quick v. Crane, 727 P.2d 1187, 1207 (Idaho 1986) (citing Pierringer v. Hoger, 
124 N.W.2d 106 (Wis. 1963»; Gauiden v. Burlington N., Inc., 654 P.2d 383, 391 (Kan. 
1982) (referring to Frey v. Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d 918 (Minn. 1978»; Hoerr v. North-
field Foundry & Mach. Co., 376 N.W.2d 323, 329-30 (N.D. 1985) (citing Frey, 269 
N.W.2d 918). In some jurisdictions, lawyers have attempted to use Pierringl1Yreleases to 
settle cases and included in the releases language to the effect that the releases are be 
interpreted in accordance with Minnesota and Wisconsin. See, e.g., Schick v. 
Rodenburg, 397 N.W.2d 464, 467 (S.D. 1987). In addition, the Uniform Comparative 
Fault Act adopts an approach to settlement that is quite similar to Pierringl1Ysettlements. 
UNIF. CoMPARATIVE FAULT Acr §§ 2,4, 12 U.L.A 50, 54 (Supp. 1993). 
42. Act of May 23, 1969, ch. 624, 1969 Minn. Laws 1069 (codified as amended at 
MINN. STAT. § 604.01-.02 (1992». For an overnew of Minnesota's adoption of compara-
tive fault, see Michael K. Steenson, The Fault with Comparative Fault: The Problem of Indi-
vidual Comparisons in a Modified Comparative Fault Jurisdiction, 12 WM. MrrcHELL L. REv. 
I, 6-22 (1985). For the earliest judicial reference to the use of Pierringl1Y releases in 
Minnesota, see Nebben v. Kosmalski, 307 Minn. 211, 212 n.l, 239 N.W.2d 234, 236 n.l 
(1976). The release referred to in the opinion was executed in 1974. For further dis-
cussion of the use of the Pierringl1Y release in Minnesota before 1978, see part III.A.I. 
43. Subdivision 5 of Minnesota Statutes section 604.01 provides that settlement pay-
ments are to be credited against the final judgment. MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. 5 
(1992). In Rambaum v. Swisher, 435 N.W.2d 19 (Minn. 1989), the Minnesota Supreme' 
Court held that the term "payments" in the statute, with respect to Pierringer settle-
ments, "refers only to payment for that portion of plaintiff's damages representing the 
settling defendant's share of liability." Id. at 23. 
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that "conditions are favorable in Minnesota for the adoption of 
this settlement device."44 A year later, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court, citing Simonett's article as "definitive," gave official ap-
proval to the Pierringer release.45 While the Minnesota court was 
influenced by many of the same considerations that prompted 
adoption of the Pierringer release in Wisconsin, there was one im-
portant difference. 
By the time Minnesota adopted Pierringer releases, lawyers 
were relying upon another form of release-the Mary Carter 
agreement.46 When first faced with the question of whether to 
approve the use of a Mary Carter-type agreement, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court stated that the validity of settlement agreements 
had to be determined on a case-by-case basis.47 The court ap-
proved the particular agreement used in that case, but stated, 
"[i] t is not proper or desirable for this court to condone or con-
demn types of settlement agreements generically."48 The court 
soon abandoned this ad hoc approach to settlement agreements. 
Much has been written about Mary Carter agreements, most of 
it critical of the agreements for distorting trial following settle-
ment. At least some of that criticism prompted Minnesota, less 
than a year after Pacific Indemnity, to generically condone Pier-
ringer settlements, and offer guidelines for their use to assure a 
fair trial to all parties.49 For these reasons, Mary Carter agree-
ments merit a closer look. 
44. Simonett, supra note 6, at 4. 
45. Frey v. Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d 918 (Minn. 1978). 
46. See infra note 49. 
47. Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548, 558 (Minn. 
1977). 
48. Id. The agreement in Pacific Indemnity was actually a hybrid settlement agree-
ment. It shared characteristics of both the "classic" Mary Carter agreement and a loan-
receipt agreement. A loan-receipt agreement is a device typically used between insurers 
and insureds to allow an insured who could not otherwise afford it to maintain an 
action against third parties to recover amounts the insurer would otherwise be obli-
gated to pay. Id. at 556. 
49. See Frey v. Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d 918, 923 (Minn. 1978). There can be no 
doubt that, at the time of its decision in Frey, the Minnesota Supreme Court was well 
aware of the power of Mary Carter agreements to distort trial. The appellant in Frey 
repeatedly characterized the Frey settlement as a Mary Carter agreement rather than a 
Pierringer release, and focused its appeal on the impact the settlement had on the con-
duct of trial. Brief of Appellant Firestone at 20-21, Frey v. Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d 918, 
922 (Minn. 1978) (No. 47620). 
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D. The Problem of Trial Distortion: Mary Carter Agreements 
The most notorious form of piecemeal settlement is the Mary 
Carter agreement.50 A Mary Carter agreement is essentially a set-
tlement agreement in which the settling defendant guarantees a 
minimum total recovery to the plaintiff regardless of whether 
the plaintiff wins or loses at trial. The settling defendant agrees 
to defend itself during the litigation and at trial. The plaintiff, in 
turn, promises to execute any judgment only against the nonset-
tling defendants. The Mary Carter agreement gives the settling 
defendant a financial interest in maximizing the plaintiff's recov-
ery against the other nonsettling defendants. The settling de-
fendant's guaranteed payment will be offset by the plaintiff's 
recovery from the nonsettling defendants. 51 The governing no-
tion of the Mary Carter agreement is that the settling defendant 
works actively at trial to increase the plaintiff's recovery and es-
pecially the plaintiff's damage award from the nonsettling 
defendant.52 
50. See Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 202 So.2d 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967), over-
ruled by Ward v. Ochoa, 284 So.2d 385 (Fla. 1973). The Mary Carter release does not 
seem to have been widely used-or at least to have drawn much attention-until the 
mid-1970s. There is no indication that the Wisconsin Supreme Court had Mary Carter 
agreements in mind when approving the release in Pierringer. See Pierringer v. Hoger, 
124 N.W.2d 106 (Wis. 1963). Nor is there any indication in reported decisions that 
litigants in Wisconsin were commonly using Mary Carter agreements or similar forms of 
release in the early 1960s. One of the principal reasons for this is, no doubt, the fact 
that the Wisconsin Supreme Court voided a Mary Carter-type agreement in 1934. 
Trampe v. Wisconsin Tel. Co., 252 N.W. 675 (Wis. 1934). For a more complete over-
view of the early history of Mary Carter-type releases, see Katherine Gay, Note, Mary 
Carter in Arkansas: Settlements, Secret Agreements, and Some Serious Problems, 36 ARK. L. REv. 
570,572 (1983). Mary Carter agreements played a more prominent role in Minnesota's 
adoption of Pierringer releases. Minnesota litigants were using Mary Carter-type agree-
ments at the time Minnesota approved Pierringer releases, and the appellant in Frey at-
tempted to characterize the release in that case as a Mary Carteragreement. Brief of the 
Appellant at 20, Frey v. Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d 918 (Minn. 1978) (No. 47620). 
51. Mary Carter agreements may provide that the plaintiff will offset the settling 
defendant's guarantee with the recovery against the other defendants on a dollar-for-
dollar basis. Alternatively, the agreement may provide that the guarantee will be offset 
with a percentage of the plaintiffs recovery against the nonsettling defendants. See, e.g., 
General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977). In either situation, the 
settling defendant still has a financial interest in working to increase the plaintiffs over-
all damage award, thus increasing the plaintiff's recovery from the nonsettling 
defendants. 
52. In Ward v. Ochoa, 284 So.2d 385 (Fla. 1973), the Florida Supreme Court de-
fined Mary Carter agreements as "a contract by which one co-defendant secretly agrees 
with the plaintiff that, if such defendant will proceed to defend himself in court, his 
own maximum liability will be diminished proportionately by increasing the liability of 
the other co-defendants." Id. at 387. Other definitions abound. The Texas Supreme 
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Criticism of Mary Carter agreements has been unusually hostile 
and shrill.53 Though courts and commentators have railed 
about the clandestine nature of Mary Carter agreements,54 the 
problem that has provoked the most scholarly and judicial bile is 
the impact Mary Carter agreements have on trial, and particularly 
Court used a broader definition in a recent decision declaring Mary Carter agreements 
"void as violative of sound public policy." Elbaor v. Smith, 845 S.W.2d 240, 250 (Tex. 
1992). The Elbaur court stated that "a Mary Carter agreement exists when the settling 
defendant retains a financial stake in the plaintiff's recovery and remains a party at the 
trial of the case." Id. at 247. 
53. This criticism has also often been gratuitously misogynistic. For example one 
author wrote: 
Like a lady of the night, she has many aliases. In Florida she is called "Mary 
Carter," but in Arizona she is known as "Gallagher." She has been branded a 
"painted lady" in Florida, but she has been popular with those who use her. 
Some in New York have wished her a hasty death. . .. Who is this sleazy lady? 
She is a living character in the law, best described as the "guaranteed verdict 
agreement." Such agreements are unholy alliances arising in cases that in-
volved a single plaintiff and multiple co-defendants. 
Larry Bodine, The Case Against Guaranteed Verdict Agreements, 29 DEF. LJ. 233 (1980). 
Bodine's chastisement is not unique. See, e.g., Edward W. Mullins, Jr. & Stephen G. 
Morrison, Who is Mary Carter and Why is She Saying Nasty Things About My Pre-Trial Settle-
ments?, 23 FOR DEF., Dec. 1981, at 14 ("Who, or what is this' Mary Carter?' Is it a well-
disguised femme fatale, who lures the unwary much as the fabled Lorelei? Or is it a 
lawyer's 'Typhoid Mary,' claiming her unknown victims by appearing to aid others?"); 
Warren Freedman, The Expected Demise of 'Mary Carter': She Neuer Was Well!, 633 INS. LJ. 
602, 603 (1975) ("The very existence of the 'Mary Carter agreement' makes it a contrac-
tual monstrosity which plagues the settlement aspects of liability law."); John Edward 
Herndon, Jr., 'Mary Carter'Limitation on Liability Agreements Between Adversary Parties: A 
Painted Lady is Exposed, 28 U. MIAMI L. REv. 988 (1974). 
54. Some courts and commentators focus on secrecy as the greatest of the Mary 
Carter evils. E.g., Ward v. Ochoa, 284 So.2d 385, 387 (Fla. 1973) ("Secrecy is the essence 
of such an arrangement, because the court or jury as trier of the facts, if apprised of 
this, would likely weigh differently the testimony and conduct of the signing defendant 
as related to the non-signing defendants."). In fact, secrecy is not the "essence" of Mary 
Carter releases, for reasons suggested in Ward itself. If secrecy really were the problem, 
it would be a problem easily remedied. Many of the jurisdictions that have considered 
the validity of Mary Carter agreements require the agreement to be disclosed to the 
court and opposing counsel. See, e.g., General Portland Land Dev. Co. v. Stevens, 291 
So.2d 250 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974). 
To be sure, some lawyers might violate the law and hide the existence of a Mary 
Carter agreement, particularly since the secrecy of the agreement could give an advan-
tage to the plaintiff and settling defendant at trial. However, this same objection ap-
plies as well to the proposed solution of outright prohibition. Lawyers who break the 
law and hide Mary Carter agreements would probably also be willing to break the law 
and enter into Mary Carter agreements. More to the point, nothing about the Mary 
Carter necessitates secrecy, and the problems Mary Carter agreements create at trial can-
not be completely solved by requiring disclosure of the agreements. For an opposing 
point of view, see David]. Grant, Note, The Mary Carter Agreement-Solving the Problems of 
Collusive Settlements inJoint Tort Actions, 47 SO. CAL. L. REv. 1393 (1974) and Ronald W. 
Eubanks & Alfonse]. Cocchiarella, In Defense of 'Mary Carter', 26 FOR DEF., Feb. 1984, at 
14. 
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the impact Mary Carter agreements have on the nonsettling 
defendants. 
Courts and commentators complain that Mary Carter agree-
ments distort trial, robbing it of "adversary vigor."55 Jurors come 
to trial expecting the plaintiff to present evidence against all the 
defendants and expecting all the defendants to stand firm and 
present evidence against the plaintiff. The Mary Carter settle-
ment realigns interests and reshapes trial in a way that is con-
trary to these expectations. Unfamiliar with the ways of litigation 
and settlement, so the argument goes, jurors will be confused 
and overwhelmed by evidence or argument that runs counter to 
their expectations. The method used to confound jurors may 
vary from case to case. For example, counsel for the settling de-
fendant might concede liability or damages during closing argu-
ment; alternatively, witnesses for the settling defendant might 
shade their testimony to favor the plaintiff.56 
55. Grant, supra note 54, at 1402. 
56. There is no better, and certainly no more popular, illustration of this concern 
than a portion of the closing argument in Ponderosa Timber & Clearing Co. v. Emrich, 
472 P.2d 358, 360 (Nev. 1970), a case involving claims arising from an automobile acci-
dent. All four of the defendants in the case pled defenses of contributory negligence 
and assumption of risk. The plaintiff negotiated a Mary Carter settlement with two of 
the defendants and then proceeded to trial. At the end of the trial, the lawyer for one 
of the settling defendants gave this closing argument: 
Now I am not going to stand here and make a fool of myself by telling you 
people that there is any merit in the defense of contributory negligence. 
There isn't. Even though that was asserted in the defenses here, as far as I am 
concerned, you can forget about that. You heard no instruction on assump-
tion of risk. So the second side of this case, if there was a second side, is out of 
the case, too .... I submit to you ladies and gentlemen there aren't three sides 
to this case, there aren't even two sides, there is one side, and that side is that 
all of these defendants are responsible to the plaintiff, and I consider it my 
duty as an officer of this court to suggest to you that in the interest of justice in 
this case, if we are to have justice in this case, there must be a plaintiff's verdict 
against all of the defendants .... This is the kind of a case when a lawyer ... 
has to remind himself of the oath that he took when he was admitted to prac-
tice ... to see that justice is done. 
Id. at 362-63. This segment of the closing argument is quoted in the dissent. The 
Ponderosa majority upheld the trial judge's denial of the nonsettling defendants' motion 
for new trial. The majority stated that there was no impropriety in the settling defend-
ant admitting liability. "That," the court ruled, "is a matter of trial strategy," and the 
settling defendant did not indicate the jury should return a verdict in excess of $20,000, 
the amount of the settlement. Id. at 360. The dissent pointed out that the settling 
defendant did, however, concede special damages in excess of $15,000. Id. at 363. This 
quote from the closing argument is a special favorite of commentators. See, e.g., Rich-
ard Casner, Note, Admission into Evidence of a Mary Carter Agreement from a Priur Trial is 
HarmfulE1TOT, 18 TEX. TECH L. REv. 997,1010 (1987); Patricia R. Morrow, Note, Is Mary 
Carter Alive and Well in Michigan: Taking a Stand on Secret Settlements in Multiparty Turt 
Litigation, 2 DET. C.L. REv. 605, 632-33 (1985); David R. Miller, Comment, Mary Carter 
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No matter what the method, the core concern is the same: 
the "unnatural" Mary Carter realignment of interests distorts trial 
and misleads jurors. The plaintiff and the settling defendant will 
use this warping of trial to work in concert to manufacture an 
unrealistically large recovery. 
Concern that Mary Carter settlements distort trial is very real 
and is supported by available case law. Courts and commenta-
tors have identified and criticized a whole host of trial problems 
spawned by Mary Carter releases. The litany of distortion is 
lengthy, and includes problems with jury selection,57 opening 
statement,58 direct examination,59 cross-examination,6o expert 
witness testimony,61 and closing argument.62 Distortion of the 
trial process, in tum, creates a risk of distortion of the trial re-
sult. In short, the risk is that the Mary Carter agreement can alter 
jury verdicts, causing nonsettling defendants to pay more than 
their fair share.63 
Agreements: Unfair and Unnecessary, 32 Sw. LJ. 779, 789 (1978); Freedman, supra note 53, 
at 620; Bodine, supra note 53, at 244. 
57. See, e.g., Lum v. Stinnett, 488 P.2d 347,348 (Nev. 1971) (allowing settling de-
fendants to "assist" nonsettling defendants with jury selection without disclosing immi-
nent settlement); Elbaor v. Smith, 845 S.W.2d 240, 246 (Tex. 1992) (noting that during 
voir dire, settling defendants' lawyers told prospective jurors that plaintiff's damages 
were "devastating," "astoundingly high," and "astronomical"). 
58. See, e.g., Lum, 488 P.2d at 348 (noting plaintiff's complaint had focused on set-
tling defendants, but opening statement targeted the nonsettling defendant). 
59. ld. at 349. 
60. ld. Here, counsel for settling defendant thoughtfully cross-examined plaintiff 
about loss of income from tips, after plaintiff's counsel failed to elicit that testimony on 
direct. See also Degen v. Bayman, 200 N.W.2d 134, 138 (S.D. 1972). 
61. See, e.g., Elhaor, 845 S.W.2d at 246. In Elhaor, the respondent's experts testified 
that respondent's doctor committed malpractice. However, in voir dire and opening 
statements, respondent's attorney stated that her doctor was "heroic." ld. 
62. See, e.g., Degen, 200 N.W.2d at 139. The Degen defense counsel, over objection, 
stated: 
I have no doubt, ladies and gentlemen, that in this case you're going to give 
Billy Degen a verdict and believe me, in this argument and particularly in a 
case like this, I think the attorneys have a real responsibility to be candid with 
the jury, and I'm trying to be with you because this is a very serious case. 
There isn't any doubt in my mind but what you're going to give Billy Degen a 
verdict. There isn't any doubt in my mind that it's going to be a substantial 
one. 
ld. The South Dakota court ruled that the statement was improper, stating that the 
jury, "[n]ot knowing the motive for the evaporation of adversary vigor" could only have 
viewed the statement as "a shattering admission." ld. The court ruled that relief was 
"necessary to let the adversary process put the issues in perspective." ld. 
63. The implicit assumption, discussed supra at note 24, returns in full force. The 
idea that a distortion in process can lead to an "erroneous" verdict assumes that there is 
some "correct" apportionment of fault that jurors can divine by means of "correct" trial 
of the case under consideration. This may be a controversial notion in some quarters. 
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E. Pierringer Releases: A Solution to the Trial Distortion Problem? 
The Picrringer release is assumed to be a valid alternative to the 
covenant not to sue because it solves the piecemeal settlement 
problem.64 It is also assumed to be a valid alternative to the Mary 
Carter agreement because it solves the trial distortion problem.65 
Whether it is a valid alternative, that is, whether it solves or cre-
ates trial distortion, turns on whether the Picrringer promise is 
kept or broken: Does the nonsettling defendant pay neither 
more nor less than its fair share of the verdict? 
III. You MAy SAY TO YOURSELF "THIS IS NOT 
My BEAUTIFUL HOUSE •.• " 
Although the Picrringer release is a vast improvement over its 
predecessors, the Picrringer release is not faultless. Two sets of 
problems vex Picrringer settlements: problems of allocation and 
problems of distortion. Appellate courts created the first set of 
problems by permitting one party in litigation to bear more than 
its fair, jury-allocated share of fault. Part A of this section dis-
cusses these problems of allocation. Problems of distortion are 
the product of the Picrringer release's impact on litigation and 
trial, and are akin to the types of problems created by Mary Carter 
releases. Part B explores these problems of distortion. 
A. Problems of Allocation: judicial Alteration of-the Ideal 
The ideal settlement release would promise that each party to 
the litigation receive that which is fair. The plaintiff would re-
ceive full compensation, and no more than full compensation, 
for those damages proximately caused by the fault of the defend-
ants. In tum, each defendant would pay for only that share of 
the damages its fault had proximately caused. That is a descrip-
tion of the ideal; it is not a description of the Picrringer release. 
This article, however, rests upon an assumption that jurors come closer to a "just," "cor-
rect," or "fair" apportionment of fault when they hear available evidence about each 
party's fault and understand the motivation each party has for presenting that evidence. 
64. See, e.g., Simonett, supra note 6, at 22. 
65. Id. at 20. Simonett noted that "[t]he Pieningerrelease does not offend any pub-
lic policy and thus can be distinguished from the somewhat discredited 'Mary Carter 
Agreement,' which is kept secret from everyone and corrupts the adversary nature of 
the trial." Id. (footnote omitted). 
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Pierringer allocation of damages differs from the ideal in at 
least four respects.66 First, the Pierringer release promises that 
nonsettling defendants will only pay their "fair share" of damages; 
the Pierringer release is silent with respect to fairness to settling 
defendants and plaintiffs. Second, in situations involving im-
mune or insolvent defendants, the other defendants may be re-
quired to pay more than their allocated share of damages. 
Third, a Pierringersettlement with a defendant who is an agent or 
intentional tortfeasor may constitute a release of claims against 
other nonsettling defendants. Fourth, at least in Minnesota, the 
law is unclear whether settling defendants may seek contribution 
from other defendants for amounts paid in settlement. 
1. The Promise Defined: Good Deals, Bad Deals 
The ideal measure of a settlement might be whether it distrib-
utes damages fairly to all parties, including plaintiffs, settling de-
fendants, and nonsettling defendants. This has not been the 
measure of Pierringer settlements. Instead, the Pierringer promise 
of fairness is only that the nonsettling defendant will pay neither 
more nor less than its fair share of the plaintiff's damages. The 
Pierringer promise ignores plaintiffs and settling defendants for a 
very good reason. Early on, courts decided that evaluating a Pier-
ringer settlement from the standpoint of plaintiffs or settling de-
fendants would sacrifice certainty in the name of fairness. 67 
Consider the following hypothetical. A woman is injured 
when her hand is caught in a ball-return machine while she is 
bowling. She sues two defendants, the out-of-state manufacturer 
of the ball-return machine and the local bowling alley. Suppose 
that our hypothetical plaintiff believes she has suffered damages 
amounting to $100,000. She negotiates a Pierringer settlement 
with the bowling alley for $30,000 and proceeds to trial against 
the manufacturer of the ball-return machine. Imagine first that 
the jury finds that the plaintiff has suffered damages amounting 
to $100,000, for which the bowling alley is eighty percent at fault 
and the manufacturer is twenty percent at fault. 
66. There is a fifth deviation from the ideal, though it is less significant. An ideal 
settlement structure would allocate costs as of the date of settlement according to rela-
tive fault. If trial and verdict follow a Pierringer settlement, however, costs will be as-
sessed only against the nonsettling defendants. Peller v. Harris, 464 N.W.2d 590, 594 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991). 
67. See Simonett, supra note 6, at 18. 
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The negotiated Pierringersettlement now appears to have been 
"unfair" in the sense that the ultimate distribution of damages is 
at odds with the jury's allocation of the "actual" fault. In this 
situation, the settlement is unfair to the plaintiff, who will re-
ceive compensation for only half her damages: the $30,000 set-
tlement from the bowling alley plus the $20,000 judgment 
(twenty percent of the $100,000 verdict). The settling defendant 
is the beneficiary of that unfairness; absent the Pierringer settle-
ment, the bowling alley would have faced a judgment of $80,000. 
Now imagine that the jury had returned a different verdict, 
finding damages of $100,000, but instead allocating one hun-
dred percent of fault to the manufacturer and zero percent of 
fault to the bowling alley. This second verdict causes the settle-
ment to seem unfair to the settling defendant, which has paid 
$30,000 but has been exonerated by the jury allocating no por-
tion of the fault to that defendant. Here, the plaintiff is the ben-
eficiary of the unfairness; she has received a total of $130,000 in 
compensation for her $100,000 of damages. 
Both these situations may seem unfair, but the unfairness is 
court-approved.68 The rationale behind judicial approval of the 
results in these types of cases is twofold. First, courts reason that 
the plaintiff and the settling defendant have struck an arms-
length deal and both should be bound by the terms of that 
agreement even if it produces a distribution of damages at odds 
with the trial verdict. Appellate courts simply let the chips fall 
where they may. A plaintiff may well be shrewd enough to nego-
tiate a Pierringer settlement with a defendant ultimately deter-
68. Rambaum v. Swisher, 435 N.W.2d 19 (Minn. 1989). In Rambaum, the plaintiff 
negotiated a $200,000 Pierringer settlement with one defendant on the first day of trial. 
Following trial, the jury verdict resulted in a total net award to the plaintiff of 
$268,241.67. The jury allocated ten percent of fault to the settling defendant. The 
court refused to deduct the settlement amount from the net award, and instead allowed 
the nonsettling defendant only a ten percent credit for the fault apportioned to the 
settling defendant. "The time to judge the fairness of the Pierringer is at the time it is 
made; and if subsequent events sometimes result in a so-called 'windfall' for plaintiff, 
that result is acceptable within the context of the law's strong policy to encourage settle-
ment of disputes." [d. at 23. The result in Rambaum is completely in accord with the 
rationale underlying Pierringer settlements. The case was remarkable, however, because 
the result directly contravenes the clear language of section 604.01, subd. 5 of the Min-
nesota Statutes, requiring settlement amounts to be credited against final judgments on 
a dollar-for-dollar, pro tanto basis. See supra note 41 for an earlier discussion of this 
issue. 
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mined to have no liability.69 That shrewd plaintiff should enjoy 
the benefits of the settlement. By the same token, the canny de-
fendant who negotiates a favorable settlement should not be 
asked to pay additional damages after the jury returns its ver-
dict.70 A deal is a deal. 
Appellate courts have used a second rationale to justify Pier-
ringer settlements that distribute damages at variance with the 
jury's allocation. Both of the hypothetical verdicts discussed 
above resulted in the settling defendant paying damages in an 
amount different from its jury-allocated "fair share" of damages. 
On the other hand, in both situations, the nonsettling defendant 
paid exactly its jury-allocated "fair share" of damages. Courts 
have tended to accept the "fairness" of the Pierringer settlement 
to the nonsettling defendant as a measure of the settlement's 
overall fairness. 71 In short, questions about double recovery for 
the plaintiff and questions about whether the settling defendant 
has paid too little or too much are, as far as appellate courts are 
concerned, irrelevant in assessing the fairness of a Pierringer set-
tlement. Fairness to the nonsettling defendant defines the fair-
ness of a Pierringer settlement. 72 
69. See, e.g., Shantz v. Richview, Inc., 311 N.W.2d 155 (Minn. 1981). The Shantz 
court reasoned: 
It should be no concern of the nonsettling defendant how much the plaintiff 
received from the settling defendant-in some cases (like this one, where it 
was later determined by the jury that the settling defendant was not negligent) 
plaintiff will have made the better bargain; in others, the settling defendant 
will have made the better bargain. 
Id. at 156. 
70. See, e.g., Frederickson v. Alton M.Johnson Co., 402 N.W.2d 794 (Minn. 1987). 
Plaintiff negotiated a $20,000 Pieninger settlement with defendant Hunt prior to trial. 
The jury returned a verdict of $800,000 and allocated forty percent of the fault to set-
tling defendant Hunt. Id. at 796. 
71. See Shantz., 311 N.W.2d at 156. "[Alll that should concern the nonsettling de-
fendant is that he not be required to pay more than his percentage share of the total 
damages which the jury determines the plaintiff sustained. ft Id. See also, Austin v. 
Raymark Indus., 841 F.2d 1184, 1191 (1st Cir. 1988). Austin involved a Pieninger settle-
ment of asbestos litigation in Maine. The court stated: 
If the settlement turns out to be greater than the amount equivalent to the 
proportionate liability of the settling defendant, then the plaintiff, in effect, 
will have made a good bargain. Conversely, if the settlement turns out to be 
less than this sum, then the plaintiff will have made a bad bargain. In either 
case, the nonsettling defendant's position is the same: it will only pay its fair share of the 
verdict. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
72. This is the same test of fairness adopted in the Uniform Comparative Fault Act. 
UN IF. CoMPARATIVE FAULT Acr § 6 comment, 12 U.L.A. 57 (Supp. 1993). See Thomas v. 
Solberg, 442 N.W.2d 73 (Iowa 1989), for a discussion of Iowa's adoption of the propor-
tionate credit rule. 
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This definition of fairness may at first seem difficult to accept. 
Mter all, double recovery of damages hardly seems fair. On the 
other hand, none of the other forms of settlement release are 
perfectly fair. Each of the alternative forms of release measures 
fairness differently and, consequently, each suffers from differ-
ent types of unfairness. For example, the pro tanto release meas-
ures fairness in terms of the plaintiff's recovery.73 With a pro 
tanto release, the settlement amount is subtracted from the ver-
dict, insuring that the plaintiff's total recovery cannot be more 
than the verdict.74 The pro tanto release looks to the plaintiff's 
recovery as the measure of fairness, and hence it has both the 
benefits and disadvantages of that measure of fairness. The set-
tling defendant could pay more than its fair share of the plain-
tiff's damages.75 Alternatively, in a separate case, the nonsettling 
defendant could also pay more than its fair share.76 This too 
may seem unfair, but in this situation it is an unfairness judged 
irrelevant because the measure of the fairness of a pro tanto re-
lease is whether the plaintiff's total recovery equals the verdict 
amount. 
The Pierringer release strikes a different balance by accepting 
the possibility of unfairness to plaintiff and settling defendant 
while insisting on fairness to the nonsettling defendant. The ra-
tionale behind this measure of fairness is sound. If a Pierringer 
settlement ultimately proves unfair to either the plaintiff or the 
settling defendant, then they have only themselves to blame. 
Unfairness arises only when the settling defendant pays too 
much or too little. In theory, if the plaintiff and settling defend-
73. See supra notes 20, 23-24 and accompanying text. 
74. However, if the settlement amount is greater than the verdict, the plaintiff will 
not receive any damages in addition to the settlement payment. 
75. Imagine that our bowling plaintiff had negotiated a pro tanto release with the 
ball-return manufacturer for $80,000. Mter trial, the jury returns a verdict of $100,000, 
and allocates 80% of the fault to the alley owner and 20% to the plaintiff. The ball-
return manufacturer will have paid more than its trial-determined fair share of fault. 
76. For example, the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act provides that a 
pro tanto settlement would discharge the settling defendant from all liability for contri-
bution. UNIF. CoNTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS Ac:r § 4(b), 12 U.L.A. 98 (1975). 
That arrangement gives certainty to the settling defendant and thus encourages settle-
ment, though at the expense of fairness to the nonsettling defendant. In that situation, 
the settling defendant might pay only $10,000 of a $100,000 verdict, leaving the nonset-
t1ing defendant liable for the remainder and bereft of any right of contribution. 
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ant negotiate wisely, the risk of unfairness should disappear.77 
Although this rationale is theoretically sound, it has a very im-
portant logical consequence. The fairness of Pierringer releases 
hinges upon fairness to the nonsettling defendant. The Pier-
ringer promise is ultimately a promise made to nonsettling de-
fendants: this form of release is fair because nonsettling 
defendants will pay no more than their fair, jury-allocated share 
of damages.78 
2. The Promise Modified: Insolvent or Immune Defendants 
Suppose that our hypothetical bowling plaintiff, in addition to 
suing the bowling alley and ball-return manufacturer, had also 
originally brought a claim against the maker of her bowling ball. 
What happens if the jury finds that the bowling ball manufac-
turer is liable for a share of the plaintiff's damages, but the bow-
ling ball manufacturer is insolvent? Are the other two 
defendants responsible for the insolvent defendant's share oflia-
bility? What if one of those defendants signed a Pierringer settle-
ment before the trial? 
a. The Wisconsin and North Dakota Approach: Allocation 
to Nonsettling Defendants 
Courts have split in their approach to this set of issues. In 
North Dakota and Wisconsin, courts have held that joint and sev-
eral liability among nonsettling defendants survives a Pierringer 
settlement. Consequently, a nonsettling defendant may be liable 
for the entire verdict, reduced only by that portion of fault at-
tributable to the settling defendants.79 If all nonsettling defend-
77. In practice, Pierringer releases may result in unfairness to either the plaintiff or 
the settling defendant for reasons other than unwise negotiation. See infra part II.B. 
for a discussion of the problems of trial distortion. 
78. Some jurisdictions have modified the promise, guaranteeing the nonsettling 
defendant that it would pay no more than its jury-allocated fair share of the verdict and 
also guaranteeing that the plaintiff would not recover more than the total amount of 
the verdict. For example, New York adopted a hybrid approach that reduces the verdict 
by either the amount received by the plaintiff in settlement or the settlor's equitable 
share, whichever amount is greater. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 15-108 (McKinney 1988). 
See In re Eastern & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 772 F.Supp. 1380, 1391-92 (E. & S.D.N.Y 
1991). This hybrid approach eliminates the possibility of overcompensation, but leaves 
open the possibility that the nonsettling defendant might be held liable for less than its 
share of the verdict. Essentially, the New York approach adapts the pro tanto measure of 
fairness-the plaintiff's ultimate recovery-to a comparative fault setting. 
79. Hoerr v. Northfield Foundry & Mach. Co., 376 N.W.2d 323, 330 (N.D. 1985); 
Chart v. General Motors Corp., 258 N.W.2d 680, 687 (Wis. 1977). 
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ants are solvent, then each will pay only its individual, jury-
allocated share of the verdict. If a remaining defendant is insol-
vent, however, then the plaintiff may collect the insolvent de-
fendant's share of damages from any of the other solvent 
defendants. Ultimately, an insolvent defendant's share of liabil-
ity can be reallocated to all of the other nonsettling defendants 
according to their own respective shares of fault. This realloca-
tion can be made either via the trialjudge's reapportionment of 
the judgment or a later action for contribution.8o 
Suppose the jury in our modified hypothetical returns a ver-
dict for $100,000 and allocates fault as follows: 
Plaintiff 10 percent 
Bowling Alley 20 percent 
Return Manufacturer 40 percent 
Ball Maker 30 percent 
If the ball maker is insolvent, its thirty percent share of fault will 
be reallocated to the two other defendants. The alley owner will 
assume responsibility for one-third of the insolvent defendant's 
share and pay a total of $30,000; the return manufacturer will 
assume responsibility for two-thirds of the insolvent defendant's 
share and pay a total of $60,000.81 None of the insolvent defend-
80. North Dakota law seems open to the trial judge's reapportionment of the insol-
vent defendant's share of damages. Hoerr, 376 N.W.2d at 333. This approach makes 
sense, since it eliminates the necessity of a later separate action for contribution. 
Wisconsin law is murky on this point. The court in Chart stated, "[t]here exists no 
rule requiring solvent, nonsettling tortfeasors to equitably share that part of a judgment 
which is uncollectible from an insolvent, nonsettling tortfeasor." Chart, 258 N.W.2d at 
687. In Chart, there was only one remaining solvent, nonsettling defendant. Chart de-
clined to permit that nonsettling defendant to seek from the settling defendant recov-
ery of a share of the insolvent defendant's portion of damages. The court's rationale 
was that the recovery would ultimately come from the plaintiff who, under the terms of 
the settlement, stepped into the shoes of the settling defendant. This would make set-
tlement too uncertain, the Chart court reasoned. [d. at 688. Later Wisconsin courts 
have, however, permitted equitable allocation among nonsettling defendants of an in-
solvent or immune defendant's share of damages. Raby v. Moe, 441 N.W.2d 263, 271 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1989); Larsen v. Wisconsin Power & Light Co., 355 N.W.2d 557, 564 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1984). But see Leverence v. PFS Corp., 504 N.W.2d 874 (table), 1993 WL 
233338, at *4 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (refusing to impute settling defendant's share of 
immune defendants' liability to plaintiffs). 
81. To determine the alley owner's additional responsibility: (1) total the remain-
ing solvent defendant's percentage shares of fault (here, the total is 0.60); (2) divide 
the alley owner's individual share of fault by that total (0.20 divided by 0.60); (3) multi-
ply that result (0.33) by the insolvent defendant's share of the verdict. 
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ant's share is reallocated to the plaintiff, even though the jury 
has found that the plaintiff was also at fault.82 
Wisconsin and North Dakota courts have not, however, held 
that joint liability survives among nonsettling and settling de-
fendants. Suppose that our hypothetical plaintiff in the bowling 
alley case negotiates a Pierringersettlement with the return manu-
facturer. At trial, the jury returns a verdict for $100,000 and allo-
cates fault as set out above. Under Wisconsin and North Dakota 
law, the alley owner will be liable for a total of $50,000, its own 
share of the verdict plus the entire share of the insolvent defend-
ant's verdict.83 In Wisconsin and North Dakota, the Pierringer 
settlement effectively transfers all responsibility for the insolvent 
defendant's share of liability to the nonsettling defendants.84 
82. See Chart, 258 N.W.2d at 687 & n.8. In Chart, the jury allocated three percent of 
fault to the plaintiff. The nonsettling defendant, General Motors, requested that any 
portion of the insolvent defendant's liability be allocated to the plaintiff on the basis of 
her fault. Instead, the Wisconsin court reallocated all of the insolvent defendant's 
share of fault to General Motors. Id. at 687-88. Apparently North Dakota has not con-
sidered the issue of the effect that fault of the plaintiff may have on reallocation of an 
insolvent defendant's share of liability. The court did not reach this issue in Hoerr be-
cause the jury allocated no fault to the plaintiff. Hoerr, 376 N.W.2d at 325. Yet the Hoerr 
court did rely on Chart in reaching its result. Id. at 333. 
83. Hoerr, 376 N.W.2d at 332; Chart, 258 N.W.2d at 687. For other courts reallocat-
ing an insolvent defendant's liability to nonsettling defendants, but refusing to reallo-
cate that share of liability to settling defendants, see In re Eastern & Southern Districts 
Asbestos Litigation, 772 F. Supp. 1380, 1403 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991), and the cases cited 
therein, and affirming on this issue In re Brooklyn Navy Yard Asbestos Litigation, 971 
F.2d 831, 845 (2d Cir. 1992), and the cases cited therein. The In re Brooklyn cases did 
not involve PierTingersettiements, but instead centered upon interpretation of New York 
statutory law. In re Brooklyn, 971 F.2d at 845. However, the district court's analysis did 
rely in part on Hoerr and Chart. Eastern & S. Dists., 772 F. Supp. at 1402. 
84. At least one Wisconsin court has criticized this approach. Raby v. Moe, 441 
NW.2d 263, 272 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds 450 N.W.2d 452 (Wis. 1990). 
The RrWy court relied on Larsen V. Wisconsin Power & Light Co., 355 N.W.2d 557 (Wis. 
Ct. App. 1984). At issue in Larsen was the proper allocation of the fault of defendants 
immune to judgment. The court ruled that the immune defendants' fault should be 
reallocated to the other defendants. Id. at 563-64. However, none of those defendants 
had settled with the plaintiff prior to trial. RrWy misrelied on Larsen because RrWy reallo-
cated part of the insolvent defendant's fault to a settling defendant but there were no 
settling defendants in Larsen. Additionally, for an early, pre-Chart critique of the Wis-
consin approach authorized by the Larsen judge, see Gordon Myse, The Problem of the 
Insolvent Contributor, 60 MARQ. L. REv. 891,903 (1977). Judge Myse authored the Larsen 
decision. 
In Leverence v. PFS Corp., 504 N.W.2d 874 (table), 1993 WL 233338 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1993), the court critiqued the decisions in Larsen and RrWy. Relying on Chart, the Lever-
enee court refused to apportion the liability of an immune defendant. Id. at *5. 
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b. The Minnesota Approach: Allocation to All Defendants 
Minnesota has adopted a far different approach to realloca-
tion of an insolvent defendant's share of liability. Minnesota's 
comparative fault statute provides that if a defendant's share of 
liability is "uncollectible," then that share must be reallocated 
among all the other parties, including the plaintiff, "according 
to their respective percentages of fault."85 
Imagine our hypothetical plaintiff had gone to trial against all 
three defendants and a Minnesota jury returned the same ver-
dict, awarding the plaintiff $100,000, and allocating fault as 
follows: 
Plaintiff 10 percent 
Bowling Alley 20 percent 
Return Manufacturer 40 percent 
Ball Maker 30 percent 
Once again, suppose that the judgment against the ball maker is 
uncollectible. Under Minnesota's statutory scheme, one-seventh 
(ten-seventieths) of the insolvent defendant's share of fault will 
be reallocated to the plaintiff. The plaintiff's judgment will be 
reduced by $4285.71; the alley owner will be liable for its own 
share plus two-sevenths of the insolvent defendant's share, pay-
ing a total $28,571.43; and the return manufacturer will pay 
$57,142.85, its own share plus four-sevenths of the insolvent de-
fendant's share.s6 
Minnesota has also adopted a different approach for realloca-
tion of an insolvent defendant's fault if one or more of the sol-
vent defendants has settled pursuant to a Pierringer release. In 
Hosley v. Armstrong Cork CO.,S7 the Minnesota Supreme Court held 
that an insolvent defendant's fault should be reallocated not 
only to the plaintiff and the nonsettling defendants, but also to 
85. MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subd. 2 (1992). The 1978 Minnesota Comparative Fault 
Act's loss reallocation provision is virtuaIly identical to the loss reallocation provision 
contained in the 1977 Uniform Comparative Fault Act. Compare UNIF. CoMPARATIVE 
FAULT ACT § 2(d), 12 U.LA 50 (Supp. 1993) with 1978 Minn. Laws 840. For a review of 
the development and analysis of Minnesota's loss reaIlocation provisions, see Michael K. 
Steenson, Comparative Fault and Loss Reallocation, MINN. TRIAL LAw. July-Aug. 1981, at 8. 
86. For example, the procedure for calculating the alley owner's responsibility for 
its portion of the insolvent defendant's share of liability is as follows: (1) total the re-
maining solvent defendants' percentage shares of fault and the plaintiff's share of fault 
(here, the total is 0.70); (2) divide the alley owner's individual share of fault by that 
total (0.20 divided by 0.70); (3) multiply that result (0.29) by the insolvent defendant's 
share of the verdict. 
87. 383 N.W.2d 289 (Minn. 1986). 
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the settling defendants.88 In Minnesota, a Pieningerrelease does 
not transfer responsibility for the insolvent defendant's share of 
liability from the settling to nonsettling defendant. Instead, un-
less the settling parties make some other agreement, realloca-
tion of the insolvent defendant's liability will be the same 
whether or not there has been a Pierringer settlement. 
The principal objection to the Minnesota approach is that it 
discourages settlement.89 The Wisconsin Supreme Court stated 
that reallocation of the insolvent defendant's fault to the settling 
defendant would defeat the purpose of settlement.90 "The mon-
etary value of the release ... would become contingent on the 
lawsuit, and thus the certainty and rationality of fixing the rights 
and liabilities between the settling defendant and plaintiff would 
be lost."91 
This concern, however, may be overstated. For plaintiffs, the 
value of every Pierringer release is contingent upon trial. It is 
true, however, that the Minnesota approach introduces a mea-
sure of uncertainty for settling defendants. The settling defend-
ant risks later responsibility for paying its share of any 
uncollectible portion of the judgment. The best way to deal with 
this concern is to allow a would-be settling defendant and the 
plaintiff to negotiate who should bear this risk. 
Under the approach the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted 
in Hosley, plaintiffs and would-be settling defendants remain free 
to allocate this risk to plaintiff instead of the settling defend-
88. [d., 383 N.W.2d at 292-93. The same approach was adopted by the First Circuit 
Court of Appeals interpreting the effect of a Pierrin~ release in a Maine settlement. See 
Austin v. Raymark Indus., 841 F.2d 1184, 1195-96 (1st Cir. 1988) (citing Hosley v. Arm-
strong Cork Co., 383 N.W.2d 289 (Minn. 1986». 
89. North Dakota offered a different objection to the Minnesota approach. Hoerr 
v. Northfield Foundry & Mach. Co., 376 N.W.2d 323 (N.D. 1985). "Although the Hosley 
majority's result might well be considered an 'expected consequence' of Pierrin~ set-
tlements in Minnesota, the same cannot be said of ... Pierrin~ settlements in North 
Dakota.K [d. at 331. This is a fine objection, especially in light of Minn. Stat. § 604.02, 
subd. 3. It is, however, an objection that should only work once. The Hoerr court could 
have solved this problem by mandating prospective reallocation, thus making the Min-
nesota approach an "expected consequenceK of all future North Dakota Pierrin~ 
settlemen ts. 
90. Chart v. General Motors Corp., 258 N.W.2d 680, 687-88 (Wis. 1977). 
91. [d. at 688. The court in Chari was concerned about the value of the settlement 
to the plaintiff because it assumed that the plaintiff's general promise to indemnify the 
settling defendant for future claims of contribution would work to make the plaintiff 
liable for the settling defendant's share of any uncollectible judgment. However, as set 
forth in Hosley, 383 N.W.2d at 294, discussed infra at notes 92-94 and accompanying 
text, the settling parties can negotiate a different arrangement. 
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ant.92 The Pierringer release in that case expressly provided that 
the plaintiff would indemnify the settling defendants for "all 
claims based on the amount of any subsequent judgment deter-
mined to be uncollectible."93 The settling defendants, conse-
quently, did not pay any additional amount for their reallocated 
shares of the insolvent defendant's liability. Instead, the plain-
tiff's judgment was reduced by this amount.94 
Minnesota's approach is preferable to the approach taken in 
Wisconsin and North Dakota. It is fundamentally unfair to allow 
a plaintiff and a settling defendant to contract to have a nonset-
tling defendant bear the entire risk of uncollectibility. However, 
this is exactly what the North Dakota and Wisconsin approach 
permit. Rather than allocating all of the risk caused by an insol-
vent co-defendant to nonsettling defendants, the Minnesota ap-
proach distributes that risk among all defendants. In addition, 
the Minnesota approach also permits the plaintiff and the set-
tling defendant to negotiate an alternative allocation of that risk. 
What happens if the parties fail to include express language in 
the agreement concerning reallocation in the event of insol-
vency? By definition, all Pierringer releases contain a plaintiff's 
general promise to indemnify the settling defendants for claims 
of contribution. In at least one case, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court has apparently held that this sort of general promise could 
also bind a plaintiff to indemnify a settling defendant for dam-
ages reallocated as a result of insolvency.95 The result seems at 
odds with Hosley, but makes sense in light of the language in Pier-
92. Hosley v. Armstrong Cork Co., 383 N.W.2d 289, 290 (Minn. 1986). 
93. [d. at 294. 
94. [d. at 294 & n.3. The Hosley decision seems to tum on the plaintiff's express 
agreement in the Pierringer releases to indemnify the settling defendants for any reallo-
cation pursuant to the Minnesota statute. See generaUy, Sharon L. Van Dyck, Comment, 
Loss Allocation and Reallocation in Minnesota: A Road in Need of Repair, 13 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REv. 389 (1987). 
95. See Frederickson v. Alton M. Johnson Co., 402 N.W.2d 794, 797 (Minn. 1987). 
The Pierringer release contained no specific language concerning reallocation in the 
event of insolvency. Brief for Appellant at A-80-82, Frederickson v. Alton M. Johnson 
Co., 402 N.W.2d 794 (Minn. 1987) (Nos. CI-85-2102, C3-85-2117). The court's broad 
construction of the Pierringer general indemnity provision seems inappropriate in light 
of its insistence on strict construction of indemnity provisions in other contracts. See, 
infra note 96, for the effect of the release language contained in the Pierringer release. 
Courts in other jurisdictions have reached a similar result, however, apparently without 
concern for the existence of any reallocation statute or the presence of specific lan-
guage in the release promising indemnification for reallocation of uncollectible dam-
ages. See Austin v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 841 F.2d 1184, 1195-96 (1st Cir. 1988) 
(noting that language in release apparently promised only that the plaintiff would "sat-
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ringer settlements releasing the settling defendant from all fur-
ther claims. Ideally, the issue of reallocating uncollectible 
damages should be expressly addressed in every Pierringer settle-
ment. However, absent express language permitting the plain-
tiff to seek uncollectible damages from the settling defendant, 
the Pierringer release provisions should bar the plaintiff from as-
serting a later claim against the settling defendant for realloca-
tion of uncollectible damages.96 
3. The Promise in Hiding: Release of Agents and Intentional 
Tortfeasors 
As part of the solution to the piecemeal settlement problem, 
the Pierringer release made it possible for a plaintiff to release its 
claim against one defendant without worry that the release 
would extinguish its claims against all other defendants. There 
are, however, at least two situations in which release of a single 
defendant could constitute an effective release of the plaintiff's 
claims against other defendants as well. Both of these situations 
can ensnare unwary plaintiffs. The first arises when a plaintiff 
releases an agent and attempts to recover damages from the 
principal; the second, when a plaintiff releases an intentional 
tortfeasor. 
a. Release of Agents 
The most common of these two situations is the release of an 
agent. In Minnesota and North Dakota, if the plaintiff negoti-
ates a Pierringer settlement with an agent, that settlement may 
constitute a release of the plaintiff's claims against the principal. 
If the plaintiff's claim against the principal is one of vicarious 
isfy" contribution claims against the settling defendants and "stand in the shoes" of 
those defendants). 
96. Typically. Pierringer agreements contain release language promising that the 
plaintiff will "refrain forever from instituting any other action or making any other de-
mand or claim of any kind against" the settling defendant. See MDLA RELEASE 
DESKBOOK (Eric J. Magnuson. ed .• 2d ed. 1990). F-3. The Pieninger agreement used in 
Frederickson contained identical release language. Brief for Appellant at A-80-82. Freder-
ickson v. Alton M.Johnson Co .• 402 N.W.2d 794 (Minn. 1987) (Nos. Cl-85-2102. C3-85-
2117). The Frederickson court reached the right result for the wrong reason. The lan-
guage in the Pieningeragreement should not have been construed to require the plain-
tiff to indemnify the settling defendant for any reallocation claims; it should have been 
construed to bar the plaintiff from making any such claims. I am indebted to my col-
league. Professor Daniel Kleinberger. for his willingness to share insights on this issue 
during conversations with me. 
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liability, any release of the agent removes the basis of that vicari-
ous liability claim.97 
This rule permits the nonsettling principal to avoid liability 
and, in a sense, pay less than its share of damages. On the other 
hand, a principal may be entitled to indemnity from its agent for 
vicarious liability stemming from the agent's negligent acts. 
Since a plaintiff agrees in a Pierringer settlement to indemnify the 
settling agent, the plaintiff steps into the shoe of the agent and 
becomes liable to the principa1.98 As a general rule, release of 
an agent also releases the principa1.99 Plaintiffs need to be alert 
to the fact that a Pierringersettlement creates no exception to this 
doctrine. 100 Caution suggests that a plaintiff avoid settlement 
with an agent or employee if the plaintiff intends to pursue 
claims against the principa1.101 
97. Minnesota law seems clear on this point. See, e.g., Reedon of Faribault, Inc. v. 
Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 418 N.W.2d 488 (Minn. 1988). Reedon involved 
an action for negligent failure to provide adequate fire insurance, wherein Pierringer 
settlement with the negligent agent constituted a release of the vicariously liable insur-
ance company. [d. at 488. See also Hoffman v. Wiltscheck, 411 N.W.2d 923 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1987) (finding that a Pierringer settlement with a negligent driver constituted re-
lease of the vicariously liable employer). 
North Dakota law is also fairly clear. See, e.g., Horejsi by Anton v. Anderson, 353 
N.W.2d 316 (N.D. 1984). In Hurejsi a guardian ad litem brought an action on behalf of 
a child injured by his caregiver. The court found release of the caregiver constituted a 
release of the injured child's parents, who had employed the caregiver. [d. at 318. But 
see McLean v. Kirby Co., 490 N.W.2d 229 (N.D. 1992). The McLean plaintiff brought an 
action for damages against the salesman who raped her, the vacuum cleaner distributor 
who employed him, and the vacuum cleaner manufacturer that employed the distribu-
tor as an independent contractor. [d. at 232. The court found the Pierringer settlement 
with the distributor did not serve to release the manufacturer. [d. at 244. 
Wisconsin law is not as clear on the vicarious liability question. Wisconsin has 
ruled that a Pierringer settlement of a minor-driver did not constitute a release of claims 
against the parent-sponsor. Swanigan v. State Farm Ins. Co., 299 N.W.2d 234 (Wis. 
1980). But see, Schroeder v. Pedersen, 388 N.W.2d 927 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986) (holding 
release of active tortfeasor constitutes release of joint venture partners from vicarious 
liability); St. Clare Hosp. v. Schmidt, Garden, Erickson, Inc., 437 N.W.2d 228, 232-33 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (" [W]here a settling plaintiff assumes the strictly liable tortfeasor's 
share of responsibility for the damages, leaving only ordinarily negligent tortfeasors as 
defendants, the plaintiff has assumed all of the liability attributable to the product."). 
The decision in St. Clare has been subject to criticism. See Komanekin v. Inland Truck 
Parts, 819 F. Supp. 802, 811 (E.D. Wis. 1993) ("By distinguishing this case from St. Clare, 
the court does not want to give added authority to that decision, the logic of which is 
not terribly compelling."). 
98. Hoffmann, 411 N.W.2d at 926. 
99. Reedon, 387 N.W.2d at 446. 
100. [d. 
101. This is certainly true if the claims against the principal or employer are based 
on a theory of vicarious liability. Other types of claims against principals or employers 
may survive a Pierringer release. In Bougie v. Sibley Manor, Inc., 504 N.W.2d 493 (Minn. 
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b. Release of an Intentional Tortfeasor 
In Wisconsin, a negligent tortfeasor is entitled to seek indem-
nity from an intentional tortfeasor. This rule has an enormous 
impact on Pierringer settlements. In Wisconsin, a plaintiff who 
releases a defendant later found to have acted intentionally has 
also released its claims against all other negligent tortfeasors. In 
Fleming v. Threshermen's Mutual Insurance Company,102 the plaintiff 
brought an action for injuries received from a sawed-off shotgun 
blast.103 Plaintiff negotiated a Pierringer settlement with the per-
son who fired the gun, and proceeded to trial against the person 
who made the gun available. Because the jury found that the 
settling defendant acted intentionally, the Wisconsin court ruled 
that the nonsettling defendant could seek indemnity.l04 Since 
the Pierringer release provided that the plaintiff indemnified the 
settling defendant, the plaintiff lost his right to recover from the 
nonsettling defendant. 105 
Though Minnesota once adhered to a similar rule, the advent 
of comparative fault has largely eroded this doctrine. l06 Unfor-
tunately, Minnesota law is not completely clear, and at least one 
court has suggested that an intentional tortfeasor might still be 
held to have lost its right to contribution.107 This approach was 
rejected in a situation involving a Pierringer release, however. In 
Ct. App. 1993), the court of appeals considered a Pieningt'T settlement in a sexual har-
assment case. The plaintiff released her supervisor who she claimed had harassed her. 
Id. at 495. Plaintiff proceeded to trial against her former employer, as well as the em-
ployer's owners. Id. at 496. The Pieningt'Tsettiement with the supervisor did not release 
the plaintiff's claims against the employer. In fact, the court held that the claims 
against the employer based upon the "sexually charged" atmosphere of the office did 
not rest upon theories of liability based upon the supervisor's knowledge and actions. 
Id. Consequently, the court of appeals upheld the trial judge's refusal to deduct the 
settlement amount from the judgment against the employer! Id. 
102. 388 N.W.2d 908 (Wis. 1986). 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 911. 
105. Id. at 912. In City of Menomonie v. Evensen Dodge, Inc., 471 N.W.2d 513 (Wis. 
Ct. App. 1991), the Wisconsin court declined to extend Fleming to include a claim for 
indemnity based on a negligent tortfeasor's responsibility to disgorge profits in excess 
of damages. Id. at 515. 
106. See, e.g., Kempa v. E.W. Coons Co., 370 N.W.2d 414, 420 (Minn. 1985) 
(" [S] tatutory comparative fault ... and apportionment of damages ... have had a signif-
icant impact on the principles of loss allocation embodied in the doctrines of contribu-
tion and indemnity."). 
107. SeeJendro v. Honeywell, Inc., 392 N.W.2d 688, 690 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (cit-
ing Kempa v. E.W. Coons Co., 370 N.W.2d 414, 420-21 (Minn. 1985». For a more 
complete discussion of indemnity issues in the comparative fault context, see Steenson, 
supra note 42, at 36 n.158. 
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Lange v. Schweitzer,108 the plaintiff entered a Pierringer release and 
proceeded to trial against the remaining defendants. The jury 
found that one of the remaining defendants was negligent. The 
plaintiff argued that the defendant's liability stemmed from a 
statutory violation, and this "illegal act" barred the defendant 
from seeking contribution. Consequently, the plaintiff argued, 
the verdict amount ought not be reduced by the amount of fault 
allocated to the settling defendant. The court rejected this 
argument. 109 
Parties negotiating a Pieninger settlement should not have to 
speculate about whether one of the defendants will lose its right 
to contribution. The necessity of this sort of speculation 
prompted one commentator to write: 
In my youth, I had an older cousin who delighted in telling 
me that there were snakes under my bed and if I so much as 
put a toe down, they would work their venomous will upon 
me. I was fairly certain there weren't any snakes, but it took a 
literal and figurative leap of faith to make it from bed to bath-
room to answer nature's call. I relive that experience every 
time I am confronted with the prospect of a Pierringer 
Release. 1 10 
The trepidation is understandable. As the law stands, plaintiffs 
in both Wisconsin and Minnesota are well advised to refrain 
from settling with defendants who might be intentional 
tortfeasors. 
4. The Promise Befuddled: Survival of Contribution Rights 
Does a nonsettling defendant have the right to contribution 
from a settling defendant? When a plaintiff signs a Pieninger re-
lease, the plaintiff makes a promise to indemnify the settling de-
fendant against any future claim for contribution made by one 
of the nonsettling defendants. As a practical matter, courts do 
not require nonsettling defendants to pay the plaintiff the entire 
judgment amount and then bring an action for contribution 
against the settling defendant, who is in tum indemnified by the 
plaintiff. III Since the plaintiff is ultimately responsible for the 
108. 295 N.W.2d 387 (Minn. 1980). 
109. [d. at 390. 
110. J. Michael Riley, N(1IIJ, About that Pieninger . .. , 16:4 WIS. ACAD. OF TRIAL LAw. 30 
(1993). 
Ill. See, e.g., Haase v. R & P. Indus. Chimney Repair Co., 409 N.W.2d 423, 427 (Wis. 
Ct. App. 1987) (holding that a settling defendant's contribution under a Pierringer re-
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settling defendant's share of liability, courts simply reduce the 
judgment by that amount,l12 
What about the opposite situation? Should a settling defend-
ant recoup the amount it has paid in settlement through contri-
bution from a nonsettling defendant? Clearly not. Allowing a 
settling defendant a right to contribution would effectively sub-
ject the nonsettling defendant to liability both for its own share 
of fault and for the settling defendant's share of faultY3 This 
would be an outright betrayal of the Pierringer promise. 
a. A Clear "No": North Dakota 
Of the three principal Pierringer jurisdictions, only North Da-
kota has legislatively resolved this issue. North Dakota statutory 
law flatly prohibits a settling defendant from obtaining contribu-
tion from other, nonsettling defendantsY4 Houser v. Gilbert1l5 
tested the applicability of this statute to situations involving Pier-
ringer settlements,l16 Houser involved a wrongful death action 
brought as the result of a tractor-trailer accident that occurred 
near a sugar beet fieldY7 The plaintiff sued the driver (Gil-
lease is imputed to the plaintiff); Fleming v. Threshermen's Mut. Ins. Co., 388 N.W.2d 
908, 911 (Minn. 1986) (same). 
112. The Pierringer release does not extinguish the right of the nonsettling defend-
ant to seek contribution. Instead it transfers liability for contribution to the plaintiff. 
See, e.g., Haase, 409 N.W.2d at 427; Fleming, 388 N.W.2d at 911. 
113. This occurs because the nonsettling defendant is paying an amount that is 
greater than his or her share based upon the jury's allocation of fault. Permitting a 
settling defendant to seek contribution may create additional inequities. See Charles v. 
Giant Eagle Markets, 522 A.2d 1, 4 n.3 (Pa. 1987). The court in Charles stated: 
[d. 
Moreover, settlement is not encouraged by allowing the settling defendant the 
right of contribution against the remaining defendants. Although the possi-
bility of a recoupment of losses may be an additional incentive to the settling 
defendant who may make a bad bargain, it would be unjust to the plaintiff 
who makes an unfavorable settlement arrangement and is bound by it. Nor is 
it appropriate to allow the settling defendant to enhance his bargaining based 
upon the subsequent trial, the consequences of which his agreement was 
designed to avoid. 
114. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-38-01(4) (1992). The statute provides that "a tort-feasor 
who enters into a settlement with a claimant is not entitled to recover contribution 
from another tort-feasor whose liability for the injury or wrongful death is not extin-
guished by the settlement nor in respect to any amount paid in a settlement which is in 
excess of what was reasonable." [d. The North Dakota statute is identical to the U ni-
form Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. See UNIF. CoNTRIBUTION AMONG 
TORTFEASORS Acr § l(d), 12 U.LA 63 (1975). 
115. 364 N.W.2d 62 (N.D. 1985). 
116. [d. at 65. 
117. [d. at 63. Houser was killed when his tractor-trailer collided with a tractor-
trailer driven by Gilbert. Gilbert settled with Fraedrich and Houser. Gilbert and 
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bert), the trucking company that owned one of the vehicles in-
volved (Fraedrich), and the farmer that owned the sugar beet 
field (Brakke). 118 
The plaintiff negotiated a Pierringer settlement with Gilbert 
and Fraedrich for $250,000. Neither of the two settling defend-
ants was dismissed and both continued to participate at trial to 
press Fraedrich's claim against Brakke for property damage to 
his truck. The jury returned a verdict allocating one hundred 
percent of fault to Brakke, awarding Houser $378,000 in dam-
ages, and awarding Gilbert and Fraedrich $47,000.1l9 Gilbert 
and Fraedrich then brought a motion seeking contribution from 
Brakke for $250,000, the amount of their Pierringer settlement 
with the plaintiff. 120 
Despite the fact that the jury found Gilbert and Fraedrich 
bore zero percent of the fault for the accident, and even though 
both Gilbert and Fraedrich participated as parties at trial, the 
North Dakota Supreme Court held that the two settling defend-
ants were barred from seeking contribution from Brakke. 121 
The court relied on the North Dakota statute in prohibiting the 
contribution action,122 but the decision would have been correct 
even without the statute. 
A post-Pierringer verdict is not reduced by the settlement 
amount but only by the settling defendant's percentage share of 
fault. Consequently, the plaintiff in Houser was entitled to keep 
the settlement proceeds and also collect one hundred percent of 
the verdict amount from the nonsettling defendant. This result 
permitted the plaintiff to recover a total greater than the jury-
determined damages, but the result was deemed fair because 
Brakke, the nonsettling defendant, would be required to pay no 
more than his jury-allocated share of the verdict (one hundred 
percent of $378,000). If the settling defendants had been per-
Fraedrich remained parties against Brakke, seeking property damages to Fraedrich's 
tractor-trailer. [d. at 64. 
118. [d. at 63. Many other third-, fourth-, and fifth-party defendants eventually be-
came parties to the suit, but their role in the accident has no bearing on the issues 
arising out of the Pierringer settlement. See, e.g., Houser v. Gilbert, 389 N.W.2d 626 
(N.D. 1986) (concerning insurance coverage issues related to the accident). 
119. Houser, 364 N.W.2d at 64. 
120. [d. 
121. [d. at 65. 
122. [d. The court noted "in view of our conclusion that [the statute] bars Gilbert 
and Fraedrich from recovering contribution, we need not determine whether the lan-
guage of the release they secured ... would also bar contribution.· [d. at 66. 
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mitted to seek contribution from Brakke, he could have ended 
up paying a total of $628,000 for the plaintiff's damages. That 
result would be fatal to the Pierringer definition of fairness. 
The law should flatly prohibit a settling defendant from bring-
ing a claim for contribution against a nonsettling defendant. 
When a defendant signs a Pierringer release, that defendant signs 
away the right to seek contribution from the other nonsettling 
defendants. The law should, however, permit a settling defend-
ant to bring a claim for its own damages against a nonsettling 
defendant. Signing a Pierringer release should not preclude a de-
fendant from continuing a cause of action for damages the de-
fendant has sustained that are the fault of the other nonsettling 
defendants. The Houser court also drew this distinction: 
Fraedrich could continue his claim against Brakke for damages 
to his truck,123 but could not seek contribution from Brakke for 
his settlement with the plaintiff. 124 
b. A Confusing "Maybe": Minnesota 
North Dakota has a statute that forbids a settling defendant 
from seeking contribution from a nondefendant as well as a 
supreme court decision that clearly applies that rule to Pierringer 
settlements. Neither Wisconsin nor Minnesota has a statute simi-
lar to North Dakota's, and their courts have yet to write local 
versions of Houser. 125 Consequently, the law in bothjurisdictions 
is uncertain. Unfortunately, in Minnesota the law is not only un-
certain, it is confusing. 
Minnesota law is confusing for at least three reasons.126 First, 
in the best of situations it can be difficult to distinguish between 
contractual rights to indemnity and contribution from equitable 
common law rights to indemnity and contribution. A Pierringer 
release creates new contractual rights of indemnity, further com-
plicating matters.127 Second, courts sometimes fail to draw clear 
123. Houser v. Gilbert, 364 N.W.2d 62, 64 (N.D. 1985). 
124. Id. at 65. 
125. With respect to Wisconsin law, see discussion infra at note 133. 
126. It is probably unfair to blame all the confusion on just three factors. For a 
discussion of other factors contributing to this wealth of confusion, including Minne-
sota's own statutory response to contractual indemnity, see Daniel S. Kleinberger, No 
Risk Allocation Need Apply: The Twisted Minnesota Law of Indemnification, 13 WM. MITCHELL 
L. REv. 775 (1987). 
127. The complexity arises because new contractual rights exist between the plaintiff 
and settling defendant. Questions of indemnity and contribution frequently arise in 
construction litigation involving breach of contract and negligence claims. Asking ju-
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lines between a defendant's right to seek damages for its own 
injuries and a defendant's right to seek damages for amounts 
paid in settlement. A Pierringer settlement may have no impact 
on the former, but it should absolutely preclude the latter.128 
Third, courts have been too quick to turn to pre-Pierringer, pre-
comparative fault authority when looking for answers to ques-
tions about contribution and indemnity following a Pierringer set-
tlement. 129 Principles and considerations that once justified 
post-settlement contribution and indemnity are simply no longer 
applicable. 
In the days before official approval of Pierringer releases, it 
made sense for Minnesota courts to permit a settling defendant 
to seek contribution from a nonsettling defendant. For exam-
ple, contribution was permitted in one case where a defendant 
negotiated a global settlement with one defendant that also re-
rors to allocate fault in these cases creates indemnity law problems that are positively 
Byzantine. See, e.g., Lemmer v. IDS Properties, Inc., 304 N.W.2d 864 (Minn. 1980). In 
Lemmer, defendants Waco and IDS settled with the plaintiff prior to verdict. [d. The 
jury exonerated IDS and Waco and allocated 20% of the fault to the plaintiff and 80% 
to another defendant, Turner. IDS and Waco sought indemnity and contribution from 
Turner. [d. at 866. IDS had a contractual right to indemnity from Turner; Waco did 
not. [d. at 869. Turner attempted to characterize the settlement as a Pierringer release 
and argued that IDS and Waco were barred from attempting to recoup their settlement 
payments. Brief for Appellant at 19-20, Lemmer v. IDS Properties, Inc., 304 N.W.2d 864 
(Minn. 1980) (Nos. 50327,50463). The court held that both IDS and Waco were enti-
tled to indemnity. [d. at 869-70. 
128. See, e.g., Stewart v. Frisch, 381 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). Stewart arose 
out of a wrongful death action involving a motorcycle accident. Wayne Denzer was 
driving a motorcycle when it struck a horse owned by Donald and Mary Frisch. Ricky 
Stewart, a passenger on the motorcycle, was killed in the accident. The trustee for 
Stewart's next-of-kin sued Denzer and the Frischs. The trustee negotiated a $17,500 
settlement with Denzer, and the two parties signed a Pierringerrelease in 1982. In 1985, 
Denzer moved to be dismissed from the lawsuit. The trial judge granted his motion 
and dismissed Denzer's indemnity and contribution cross-claim against the Frischs. At 
trial, the jury allocated 80% of the fault to settling defendant Denzer, 20% to decedent 
Stewart, and none to the Frischs. [d. at 1-2. Six years after the accident and two years 
after the trial, Denzer brought an action for damages against the Frischs. See Denzer v. 
Frisch, 430 N.W.2d 471 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). The Frischs argued that the earlier jury 
allocation of fault collaterally estopped the claim. The court of appeals disagreed; 
"[C]entral to our analysis is that the foregone cross·daim was for contribution/indemni-
fication, not for Denzer's damages." [d. at 474. Denzer's complaint in the later action 
contained no claim for recoupment of the settlement paid to Stewart. Brief for Appel-
lant at 12, Denzer v. Frisch, 430 N.W.2d 471 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (No. C7-88-871). 
129. See, e.g., Lemmerv. IDS Properties, Inc., 304 N.W.2d 864, 868-70 (Minn. 1980). 
Though Lemmer concerned contractual rights to indemnity, much of the court's deci-
sion seems to rest on pre-Pierringer settlement law. [d. at 868-69 (discussing the "com-
mon liability rule" which allowed contribution "where both parties were liable to the 
plaintiff, but where they were not joint tortfeasors."). 
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leased all other defendants, but the other defendants paid noth-
ing toward the settlement. 130· Contribution may seem just in 
situations where the settling defendant has "overpaid," and this 
overpayment results in some benefit or unjust enrichment to the 
nonsettling defendant. 131 
With Pierringer settlements, however, this rationale does not 
work. The nonsettling defendant must pay its jury-allocated 
share of the verdict regardless of the dollar amount of the Pier-
ringer settlement. Pierringer releases are supposed to eliminate 
the possibility of unjust enrichment of the nonsettling defend-
ant. Consequently, there is no reason to permit a settling de-
fendant to seek equitable contribution or indemnity following a 
Pierringer settlement. 132 Permitting this kind of claim for contri-
bution exposes a nonsettling defendant to liability for more than 
its jury-allocated share of fault. This is an outright betrayal of 
130. Samuelson v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. RR, 287 Minn. 264, 178 N.W.2d 620 
(1970). Defendant Rock Island Railroad settled the entire claim, obtained a general 
release from the plaintiff, and sued a third-party defendant for contribution to the set· 
tlement. The court reasoned that permitting the third-party defendant "to avoid contri-
bution on the ground that Rock Island's liability has not been adjudicated would ... 
unjustly enrich third-party defendant, a result which the remedy of restitution upon a 
claim of either contribution or indemnity was intended to prevent." [d. at 624. But see 
Tefft v. Tefft, 471 A.2d 790, 795 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983) (holding that settle-
ment by all tortfeasors bars an action for contribution). 
131. Problems of unjust enrichment might also warrant contribution in situations in 
which the amount of the settlement is deducted from the verdict (a pro tanto reduc-
tion). If the settlement is large enough (or the verdict small enough) and the settle-
ment amount is set-off against the verdict, the nonsettling defendant may end up 
paying less than its jury-allocated share of the verdict. See, e.g., Charles v. Giant Eagle 
Mkts., 522 A.2d 1, 2 (Pa. 1987). Contribution is barred in this situation under the 
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, which was the model for the North Da-
kota statute discussed supra in part II.AA.a. UNIF. CoNTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS 
Acr § l(d), 12 U.L.A. 63 (1975). If the verdict amount defines the plaintifrs "true" 
damages, unjust enrichment of the nonsettling defendant is not possible in jurisdic-
tions that discount verdicts on a pro rata basis. Assume that the plaintiff and the settling 
defendant negotiate a $50,000 settlement. The plaintiff proceeds to trial against the 
one remaining defendant, and the jury awards a total of only $20,000 in damages. The 
verdict will be discounted by one half (the settling defendant's pro rata share), and the 
nonsettling defendant will pay $10,000. The settling defendant may have overpaid, but 
that overpayment has not resulted in any tangible benefit to the nonsettling defendant. 
132. A Pierringer release should not, however, extinguish a settling defendant's 
claims against the nonsettling defendant for damages stemming from the settling de-
fendant's own injuries. Nor should a Pierringerrelease extinguish a settling defendant's 
independent contractual right to indemnity, should one exist. Both these kinds of 
claims survive a Pierringer settlement. Cautious practice would counsel that the release 
expressly preserve these claims. The holding in Denzer, 430 N.W.2d at 474, however, 
suggests that the release need not expressly reserve a settling defendant's claim for 
damages for its own injuries. 
HeinOnline -- 20 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 41 1994
1994] PIERRINGER SETTLEMENTS 41 
the Pieningerpromise. Both Minnesota and Wisconsin133 should 
clarify their law concerning contribution and indemnity follow-
ing a Pieninger settlement. As it stands, Minnesota law is an open 
invitation to error. 134 
B. Problems of Distortion: The Effect of Pierringer Releases on 
Litigation and Trial 
If the world and litigation were ideal, the Pieninger settlement 
would promise that each party will pay damages in accordance 
with its jury-allocated share of fault. As shown in the previous 
section, the Pieninger settlement cannot make this promise. In-
stead, the Pieninger settlement offers an alternative promise: that 
the nonsettling defendant will pay no more nor less than its 
share of fault. Unfortunately, because of the impact that the 
Pieninger settlement has on the litigation and trial process, this 
promise too is broken. Appellate decisions have offered insuffi-
cient guidance regarding the conduct of litigation and trial fol-
lowing a Pieninger settlement. 
133. A recent Wisconsin Court of Appeals decision may accomplish this. In Unigard 
Ins. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., No. 93-1644; 1994 WI.. 120022 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 12, 
1994), Unigard sought contribution and indemnity for amounts it paid pursuant to a 
Pierrin~settlement in another action. Following the trial in that action, the jury deter-
mined that the plaintiffs injuries were caused solely by the plaintiff's own fault and the 
fault of other nonparty tortfeasors. Unigard argued it was entitled to contribution and 
that it had expressly reserved its right to seek contribution and indemnity from other 
nonsettling tortfeasors in the Pierrin~ release. Stating that "Unigard could ... reserve 
only what it rightfully and equitably possessed," the Wisconsin court ruled that a Pier-
rin~ release extinguishes a settling defendant's right to seek contribution and indem-
nity for amounts paid in settlement from any other tortfeasor, whether a named party 
or not. [d. at *4. The Wisconsin court further noted that permitting a second trial of 
the same fact situation "would defeat all the salutary effects of Pierrin~ law and frus-
trate judicial economy." [d. at n.6. 
134. At least one court may have accepted this invitation. Alumax Mill Prods. v. 
Congress Fin. Corp., 912 F.2d 996 (8th Cir. 1990) (applying Minnesota law). Alumax 
involved the financial collapse of an aluminum fabricator. Alumax, an aluminum sup-
plier, filed a suit for lender and accountant liability. The lender, Congress Financial, 
filed a separate suit against the two accountants. Alumax negotiated a Pierrin~-type 
settlement with the two accountants. Citing Denzer v. Frisch, the court of appeals held 
that the settlement had no preclusive effect on the settling accountants. [d. at 1012. It 
is unclear what claims the settling defendants preserved against Congress Financial 
since the district court dismissed with prejudice the accountants' claims for contribu-
tion and indemnity. [d. at 1001. The Pienin~ settlement also should have precluded 
the accountants from asserting claims for settlement payments in any other suit because 
Congress Financial suffered no independent harm from the accountants other than by 
Alumax's claims. 
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The result is that Pieningersettlements have distorted litigation 
and trial in some instances. Pierringer settlements create 
problems at trial due to difficulties surrounding proof of the set-
tling defendant's fault. At a trial following a Pierringer settle-
ment, the plaintiff no longer has an incentive to prove the 
settling defendant's fault, but the remaining defendants do. Un-
fortunately, problems created by the settlement may undermine 
the parties' ability to prove the settling defendant's fault or ab-
sence of fault. Following a brief overview of the guidance appel-
late courts have given about the conduct of trial after a Pierringer 
settlement, this section explores the problems of proof these set-
tlements may create at trial. 
These problems of proof at trial are the most obvious way Pier-
ringer settlements distort the litigation process. However, like a 
stone dropped in a pond these problems at trial ripple outward. 
A Pierringer release not only disrupts determination of fault at 
trial, it may also distort the process of discovery. This distortion 
of trial and discovery may, in turn, create problems affecting set-
tlement. In the backwash of these problems, the Pierringer settle-
ment can no longer keep its promise that the nonsettling 
defendant will pay neither more nor less than its fair share of 
fault. 
1. Guidance from the Bench 
In the thirty years since Pierringer v. Hoger,135 few reported de-
cisions have given much attention to the conduct of litigation 
and trial following a Pieningersettlement. The Pieningerdecision 
itself offers little practical guidance to the trial court. Pierringer 
states only that the settling defendant need not participate in 
trial and that the settling defendant's fault should be included in 
the special verdict apportionment question.136 
For specific advice about litigation and trial following a Pier-
ringersettlement, a trialjudge must turn to the decision in Frey v. 
Snelgrove. 137 Frey offers four specific suggestions for what should 
be done following a Pierringer settlement: 
135. 124 N.W.2d 106 (Wis. 1963). 
136. [d. at 111-12. 
137. 269 N.W.2d 918 (Minn. 1978). 
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1. Lawyers for the settling parties should notify the trial 
court immediately after the Pierringersettlement and have 
the terms of the agreement made part of the record. 138 
2. The settling defendants should be dismissed following 
settlement unless the settling defendant must "continue 
as a party for the limited purpose of defending against 
the surviving cross-claim."139 
3. If the settlement is executed during trial, the court 
should inform the jury that there has been a settlement 
in order to explain the settling defendant's absence. 140 
4. Generally, however, the amount paid in settlement 
should never be submitted to the jury.141 
43 
To a certain extent, each of these suggestions is appropriate, and 
each is helpful to a trial judge faced with a mid-trial Pierringer 
settlement. Unfortunately, in the fifteen years following the Frey 
decision, there has been virtually no further development in this 
area of the law. 
2. Problems of Proof at Trial 
Mary Carter releases are held in disrepute largely because of 
the impact they may have on a trial. 142 Courts disapprove of 
Mary Carter releases because they rob a trial of its adversarial 
vigor. 143 The defendant settling pursuant to a Mary Carter re-
lease works to maximize the plaintiff's recovery from other de-
138. Id. at 923. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. If settlement occurs before trial, tlle court has discretion whether to dis-
close tlle settlement to tlle jury. In tllis situation tllere is admittedly no sudden and 
mysterious disappearance of a defendant that needs explanation. If, however, a settling 
defendant's fault is at issue and evidence of tllat fault will be introduced at trial, the 
trial court should disclose tlle existence of tlle settlement to tlle jury. Wit110ut tllis 
disclosure, the jury will be left to guess why tlle settling defendant is not in court. See 
Mujwid v. Gillis, No. C3-92-2461, slip op. at 3 (Minn. Ct. App. May II, 1993) (finding 
that the fault or negligence of the settling defendant should be submitted to the jury 
where tlle record contains evidence of its fault or negligence). For an eloquent dissent 
to tlle rule of disclosure by a recent commentator, see Riley, supra note 110, at 30. 
141. Frey, 269 N.W.2d at 923. 
142. See supra notes 50 tllrough 63 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
use of Mary Carter releases. 
143. See Com Exch. Bank v. Tri-State Livestock Auction Co., 368 N.W.2d 596, 599 
(S.D. 1985); Degen v. Bayman, 200 N.W.2d 134, 139 (S.D. 1972); City of Houston v. 
Sam P. Wallace & Co., 585 S.W.2d 669, 674 (Tex. 1979). 
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fendaOnts. l44 This ostensibly leaves jurors bewildered and unable 
to "correctly" apportion fault. 145 
Although courts have been quick to comment on and criticize 
the problems Mary Carter releases create at trial,146 they have 
given scant attention to the similar problems Pierringer releases 
may create.147 Unfortunately, Pierringer settlements may also rob 
a trial of at least a portion of its "adversary vigor." This happens 
for two reasons. First, like Mary Carter releases, Pierringer settle-
ments create an incentive for participants at trial to take posi-
tions contrary to those the jury would expect. Second, Pierringer 
settlements may deprive the jury of much of the evidence con-
cerning the settling defendant's liability. 
a. Who Will Prove the Settling Defendant's Fault? 
Following a Pierringer settlement, a plaintiff no longer has any 
incentive to prove the settling defendant's fault. Recalling our 
hypothetical with the bowling plaintiff, assume that the plaintiff 
settles with the ball-return manufacturer. The jury will consider 
the manufacturer's fault in its special verdict, and the plaintiff 
has an interest in seeing that the percentage of fault allocated to 
the manufacturer is as small as possible. If the jury allocates one 
hundred percent of fault to the settling manufacturer, the plain-
tiff will recover nothing from the nonsettling defendants. If the 
jury allocates zero percent of fault to the settling manufacturer, 
144. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
145. Once again we face the metaphysical issue of what the "correct" apportionment 
of fault might be. Is a fault allocation determined by a jury somehow more fair than a 
fault allocation arrived at through settlement negotiation? What is meant by "fair"? A 
fault allocation is fair if it is the same as the allocation the jury would have made had 
there been no settlement. This is my definition. It is also the definition appellate 
courts implicitly adopt when making the Pierringer promise-the Pierringer release is fair 
because the nonsettling defendant will pay no more or less than its jury-allocated share 
of fault. This promise only has substance if it means the nonsettling defendant will pay 
no more or less (or not a whole lot more or less) than it would have absent the 
settlement. 
146. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
147. The effect Pierringerreleases may have on trial has not gone completely unrec-
ognized. In his seminal article on Pierringer releases, Simonett warned: 
The Pierringer release may place the non-settling tortfeasor at a tactical disad-
vantage, but this does not taint the release's validity .... Also, the non-settling 
tortfeasor finds himself no longer able to cross-examine the settling tortfeasor 
as an adverse party. . .. He can attempt to place the blame for the tort on the 
settling tortfeasor who is no longer defending himself, except to the extent 
plaintiff's counsel indirectly assumes his defense. 
Simonett, supra note 6, at 21-22. 
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the plaintiff will recover its judgment from the bowling alley and 
also keep the settlement proceeds from the manufacturer. 
Following the Pieninger settlement between the plaintiff and 
the ball-return manufacturer, the bowling alley has an incentive 
to prove the manufacturer's fault. The bowling alley wants the 
jury to allocate as large a share of fault as possible to the manu-
facturer because this will work to reduce the bowling alley's own 
share of fault. 148 If the bowling alley fails to introduce evidence 
of the manufacturer's fault, then the trial judge may direct a ver-
dict in favor of the manufacturer. 149 
In other words, a Pieninger release does more than simply give 
the bowling alley owner the incentive to prove the fault of the 
manufacturer. The Pieninger settlement transfers to the remain-
ing defendant the burden to prove the settling defendant's fault. 
If the remaining defendant fails to meet that burden, the trial 
court can direct a verdict against the settling defendant and 
strike that defendant's name from the special verdict list of par-
ties to whom the jury will allocate fault.I5o 
Whether the nonsettling defendant is easily able to meet this 
burden of proof depends on two factors: (1) the timing of the 
Pieninger settlement; and (2) the nonsettling defendant's trial 
strategy. Suppose our hypothetical bowler negotiates a Pieninger 
settlement with the manufacturer well before trial. Because of 
148. The bowling alley has a second alternative to reduce its share of fault. The 
bowling alley could also attempt to prove that the plaintiff is at fault for her own acci-
dent. If this has been the alley's strategy all along, if the alley planned on conceding-
or actively arguing-that the manufacturer was not at fault, then the Pierringer release 
will have no adverse impact on the bowling alley's strategy. 
149. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 622 v. Keene Corp., 495 N.W.2d 244, 250 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1993) (reasoning that "given Keene's failure to introduce evidence sufficient 
to justify sending the question of the codefendants' fault to the jury, the trial court 
properly declined to instruct on this issue"); see also Nelson v. Trinity Medical Ctr., 419 
N.w.2d 886, 890 (N.D. 1988) (holding that, in a medical malpractice case, the trial 
judge's refusal to submit the fault of settling doctors to the jury was not erroneous 
because the nonsettling hospital had failed to introduce evidence of the doctors' fault). 
150. If the nonsettling defendant introduces no evidence of the settling defendant's 
fault, the plaintiff should affirmatively request that the fault of the settling defendant 
not be submitted to the jury. If the plaintiff fails to object to submission of the settling 
defendant's fault, then the court will include the settling defendant in the allocation 
question. The jury is apparently then free to allocate fault to that defendant, and this 
allocation will not normally be disturbed on appeal. See Bloom v. Hydrotherm, Inc., 
499 N.W.2d 842, 845-46 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). 
Likewise, an appellate court ought not reverse a trial judge's decision not to submit 
a settling defendant's fault to the jury if the remaining defendant failed to object at the 
time. See Fire Ins. Exch. v. Adamson Motors, No. C7-93-1680, 1994 WL 120025 (Minn. 
Ct. App. Apr. 12, 1994). 
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the advance notice of settlement, the bowling alley can accord-
ingly plan to prove the manufacturer's fault at trial. 151 Con-
versely, if the settlement is made during trial, the nonsettling 
defendant may be caught by surprise and have to dramatically 
alter its trial strategy.152 Suppose the bowling alley planned to 
defend by focusing on the plaintiff's own conduct, claiming that 
the ball-return was in safe working order and the accident was 
completely the result of the plaintiff's carelessness. The bowling 
alley now has two choices. First, it can change its strategy in mid-
trial, which may be difficult to do without damaging its credibil-
ity with the jury. Second, it can allow the case to proceed with-
out presenting any evidence against the manufacturer and hope 
that the jury is persuaded that the plaintiff is principally at 
fault. 153 
If the nonsettling defendant presents evidence of the settling 
defendant's fault, then the plaintiff finds itself in an awkward 
position. Unless the plaintiff allows that evidence to come in un-
contested, it will have to offer proof exonerating the settling de-
fendant. In other words, if the bowling alley submits evidence of 
the manufacturer's fault, the plaintiff must offer rebuttal evi-
dence that the manufacturer was innocent of fault. Since the 
plaintiff sued and settled with the manufacturer, the jury may 
have trouble accepting this evidence and the jury may doubt the 
plaintiff's credibility.154 
151. As argued in the following section, this may not be as easy as it would be if the 
manufacturer were still a party to the suit. 
152. It seems reasonable to believe that a significant proportion of Pierringer settle-
ments are negotiated on the eve of trial or during trial. By my calculations, of the 48 
most recent Minnesota court of appeals decisions indicating the timing of Pierringer 
settlement in the case, one-fourth indicate that the settlement occurred at trial or im-
mediately before. 
153. Has settlement changed anything if the bowling alley simply follows its planned 
strategy and presents evidence of the plaintiff's fault? Settlement has increased the risk 
associated with the bowling alley's strategy. If no evidence against the manufacturer 
comes in, then the jury will not have the opportunity to allocate fault to the manufac-
turer. If the strategy fails and the jury is persuaded that the plaintiff is not at fault, then 
100% of fault may be allocated to the bowling alley. If the manufacturer were still at 
trial, the plaintiff would have an incentive to present evidence of the manufacturer's 
fault, and the jury might allocate some fault to the manufacturer. In short, absent set-
tlement, there is another party to whom the jury may allocate fault in case the defense 
strategy fails. 
154. So what? Don't plaintiffs deserve this problem? In situations where plaintiffs 
settle with defendants who may bear a substantial share of fault for the damages, we can 
criticize the plaintiffs' strategy and say that they have created a problem they deserve. If 
plaintiffs, however, believe they do not have the ability to introduce credible evidence 
minimizing the settling defendant's fault, then plaintiffs may decide not to settle. The 
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In short, a Pierringer settlement realigns interests at trial in 
somewhat the same manner that a Mary Carter settlement 
realigns those interests. Mter a Pierringer settlement, defendants 
may have an unexpected incentive to present evidence against 
one another, and plaintiffs may face the challenging prospect of 
defending settling tortfeasors. 
b. How Will the Settling Defendant's Fault be Proved? 
Pierringer releases realign the interests of litigants. This re-
alignment may not only be contrary to what many jurors per-
ceive as the natural interests of the remaining parties, but also 
may be contrary to a party's own interest in forming its trial strat-
egy. Even in the best of situations, it may be awkward for the 
plaintiff and remaining defendants to prove or disprove the set-
tling defendant's fault. Unfortunately, trials are s~ldom the best 
of situations. Frequently, proof of the settling defendant's fault 
is not simply awkward, it is nearly impossible. When a Pierringer 
settlement is reached, a great deal of evidence about a settling 
defendant may evaporate. 
t. Loss of Plaintiff's Evidence 
First, the plaintiff's own evidence implicating the settling de-
fendant may never reach the jury. Let us return to our hypothet-
ical with the bowling alley. Following the settlement with the 
ball-return manufacturer, the plaintiff no longer has any incen-
tive to present evidence of the manufacturer's fault. I55 This evi-
dence would reduce the plaintiff's recovery from the bowling 
alley. To be sure, the bowling alley will want to prove the manu-
facturer's fault. The alley, however, will not have equal access to 
the plaintiff's expert testimony-probably the most important 
evidence implicating the manufacturer. If the plaintiff's expert 
has been deposed, then the bowling alley can introduce the dep-
justice system favors settlements-even piecemeal settlements-so the structure of trial 
following a Pierringer settlement should not discourage settlement. Remember, also, 
that the Pierringer promise is that the nonsettling defendant will pay neither more nor 
less than its share of fault. If the bowling alley can introduce uncontradicted evidence 
of the settling manufacturer's fault, then the bowling alley may end up paying less than 
its fair share of the plaintiffs damages. 
155. Actually, the plaintiff has almost no incentive to present this evidence. The 
plaintiff may chose to introduce some evidence of the settling defendant's fault simply 
to avoid a loss of credibility with the jury. In particular, if the plaintiff's testifying ex-
perts opined on the settling defendant's fault in earlier reports, the plaintiff may want 
the experts to testify about this to avoid impeachment on cross-examination. 
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oSItIOn. If there is no deposition, the alley owner may have to 
rely on the expert's written report or responses to interrogato-
nes. All of this is a poor substitute for live testimony. 
n. Absence of the Settling Defendant 
Unlike the situation following a Mary Carter agreement, once 
the ink has dried on the Pierringer release, the settling defendant 
disappears from trial. Some courts have held that a settling de-
fendant's absence is simply not a problem.156 This view seems 
myopic. In all likelihood, the settling defendant will be the best 
source of information about its own fault or lack thereof. 
In our hypothetical, the bowling alley may well believe that 
close questioning of the manufacturer or its employees is critical 
to prove the manufacturer's fault. The manufacturer's testi-
mony may also be the best evidence the plaintiff has of the man-
ufacturer's absence of fault. The remaining parties to the 
litigation have a legitimate interest in introducing the settling 
defendant's testimony and the jury needs to hear that testimony 
in order to apportion fault among all the parties. As other 
courts have recognized, determination of an absent party's fault 
"may well lack the vigor and clarity which would be present if the 
absent party were actually in the litigation."157 
156. See, e.g., Young v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 524 F. Supp. 1147, 1152 (E.D. Pa. 
1981). The plaintiff in Young settled with defendant Verson pursuant to a "Griffinft 
release-a Pennsylvania form of release similar to a Pierringer release. The nonsettling 
defendant, Federal Pacific Electric, objected to the settlement on the grounds that it 
would be prejudiced ifVerson were absent from trial. Id. at 1148. Relying on the deci-
sion in Pierringer, the Pennsylvania court stated: 
It is simply a non sequitur to maintain, as Federal does, that without the pres-
ence of Verson, the factfinder cannot determine the extent of Federal's com-
parative negligence vis-a-vis Young. Nothing prevents Federal from 
introducing whatever probative evidence of Verson 's culpability it may other-
wise have offered with Verson present at trial. 
Simply put, there is no practical economic benefit that will inure to Fed-
eral from Verson's presence. The potentially dramatic effect of pointing at an 
acquiescent defendant is not a sufficient reason to force Verson to bear the 
additional expense of appearing at trial after settling with plaintiff and after 
signing a release that provides Federal with all the economic benefits which 
Federal could have achieved after a trial in which Verson was present. 
Id. at 1152 (footnote omitted). 
157. Bowman v. Barnes, 282 S.E.2d 613,620 (W. Va. 1981). Bowman involved a ques-
tion of whether absent tortfeasors should be included in the jury's allocation of fault. 
Although the decision looks to Pierringer for some guidance, Bowman did not arise out 
of an absence due to settlement. Id. at 620. See also, Gaulden v. Burlington Northern, 
Inc., 654 P.2d 383, 391 (Kan. 1982). Gaulden involved a Pierringersettlement. The ma-
jority held that the settling defendant's fault should have been submitted to the jury 
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In some situations, absence of the settling defendant is a prob-
lem easily solved. If the settling defendant is within the court's 
subpoena power, any of the remaining parties can compel the 
settling defendant to appear and testify at trial. 158 Returning to 
our bowling hypothetical, the settling defendant is the manufac-
turer, an out-of-state corporation. If the trial judge dismissed 
the manufacturer from the lawsuit, as would occur following 
most Pierringer settlements, the manufacturer and its employees 
may be beyond the court's subpoena power. In these situations, 
it is reasonable to expect that the remaining parties will have 
deposed the manufacturer's key employees. Although these 
depositions can be used at trial,159 a deposition is a poor substi-
tute for live testimony. The jury will be left to decide the fault of 
foUowing the Pierringer settlement, but that settling defendant was properly dismissed 
from the litigation. [d. at 392. The concurring justice contended: 
[T] he railroad [the remaining defendant] is entitled to have James [the settling 
defendant] remain as a party in the lawsuit regardless of James' settlement 
with the plaintiff. This permits aU issues of liability and damages to be liti-
gated within the context of the original lawsuit where aU potentiaUy responsi-
ble parties are available. Whether James continues to retain counsel to 
represent him as a party in the action, however, is a matter entirely within his 
discretion. 
[d. at 395. See also, Gross v. Midwest Speedways, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 36, 44 (Wis. 1977) 
(dissent). 
158. At trial, the plaintiff and the remaining defendants wiU aU be able to examine 
the settling defendant. At least one authority has suggested, however, that the party 
calling the settling defendant wil1 be unable to cross-examine the witness. See Simonett, 
supra note 6, at 21 & n.99 (citing MINN. R. CIV. P. 43.02). Rule 43.02 permits cross-
examination of not only the hostile or adverse witness, but also of "a witness identified 
with an adverse party." MINN. R CIV. P. 43.02. Most often, this means that an employee 
or agent of the adverse party may be cross-examined. But see Hemze v .. County of 
Renvil1e, 255 Minn. 115, 117, 95 N.W.2d 596, 597 (1959) (concluding that since the 
county is not an "adverse party" under Rule 43:02, its employee is not subject to being 
cal1ed for cross-examination). However, trial judges have wide discretion as to when 
cross-examination is warranted, and "[a]l1 that need be established is that the relation-
ship between the witness and the adverse party is such that the witness appears to have 
sufficient interest in the litigation so as to be identified with the adverse party." 2 DAVID 
F. HERR & ROGER S. HAYDOCK, MINNESOTA PRAcnCE, CIVIL RuLES ANNOTATED § 43.7 (2d 
ed. 1985 & Supp. 1993). In most trials fol1owing a Pierringersettlement, the remaining 
defendant wiU attempt to establish the settling defendant's fault and the plaintiff wil1 
attempt to minimize that fault. In this type of situation, it makes good sense for a trial 
judge to exercise discretion and permit the remaining defendant to cross-examine the 
settling defendant. 
159. MINN. R. CIV. P. 32.01 (c) (2). This Rule permits a party to use the deposition of 
an out-of-state witness "unless it appears that the absence of the witness was procured by 
the party offering the deposition." [d. In a sense, the plaintiffs decision to settle pro-
cures the absence of the settling defendant. Should this bar the plaintiff from introduc-
ing the deposition? No, unless the remaining defendant can show that the settlement 
was negotiated principaUy to procure the absence of the settling defendant. 
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a party never seen and assess the credibility of witnesses never 
heard. 
iii. Absence oj the Settling Defendant's Experts 
From a plaintiff's standpoint, the most important evidence 
lost following a Pieninger settlement may well be the testimony of 
the settling defendant's experts. In many cases, the most potent 
evidence rebutting a settling defendant's fault will be that de-
fendant's own expert testimony. Once the plaintiff and the set-
tling defendant have reached agreement, the burden of proving 
the settling defendant's fault passes to the remaining defend-
ants. For example, in our hypothetical, after the plaintiff settles 
with the manufacturer, the bowling alley will attempt to prove 
the manufacturer's fault. The plaintiff, in turn, will have both 
the incentive and responsibility for rebutting whatever proof the 
bowling alley offers. Otherwise, the plaintiff will find its recovery 
reduced because a portion of the fault is allocated to the 
manufacturer. 
As argued above, a Pieninger settlement at or near trial may 
catch the remaining defendants off guard. In our hypothetical, 
it is possible that the bowling alley will have no expert of its own 
to testify about the manufacturer's fault. It is virtually certain, 
however, that the plaintiff will have no expert of her own to re-
but testimony about the manufacturer's fault. Our plaintiff can-
not hire a "backup" expert who will be available to testify, in the 
event of settlement, that the manufacturer's product was not de-
fective after all. A plaintiff cannot develop evidence exonerating 
a defendant.I6o The one and only source of expert opinion sup-
porting a settling defendant will likely be the settling defend-
ant's own experts. Must a party simply forego all expert 
testimony proving the settling defendant's fault? Following the 
Pieninger settlement, our plaintiff has three possible avenues to 
this testimony. 
The first avenue is through the settling defendant itself. The 
settling defendant may be willing to allow the plaintiff access to 
its experts before and during trial, in effect permitting the plain-
160. Why not? Because, assuming that no Pierringer settlement is made before trial, 
the plaintiff cannot be certain it will be able to settle with a particular defendant. Con-
sequently, to survive summary judgment of its claims, a plaintiff must develop a prima 
facie case against each of the defendants. Development of evidence favorable to any 
one defendant would effectively scuttle the plaintiff's own claims against that defend-
ant, as well as the plaintiff's ability to negotiate a settlement with that defendant. 
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tiff to hire those experts. If so, then the plaintiff and settling 
defendant can make this arrangement part of their Pierringcr set-
tlement. 161 Without the settling defendant's agreement, how-
ever, the attorney work product doctrine may bar the plaintiff 
from obtaining access to these experts.162 If settling defendants 
were routinely willing to allow plaintiffs access to their experts, 
this problem would be solved. It is unrealistic to expect, how-
ever, that defendants will always be so accommodating. It is easy 
to imagine situations in which a defendant would be reluctant to 
permit plaintiff's counsel ready access to an expert. In most 
product liability cases, as well as many professional malpractice 
cases, a defendant may have strategically sound reasons for refus-
ing to allow a plaintiff to have access to its experts. 163 
The second avenue to the settling defendant's expert testi-
mony is more traditional. If the expert has been deposed, the 
plaintiff may simply introduce the deposition transcript. Ideally, 
the plaintiff will have anticipated the possibility of settlement 
and will have obtained a videotaped deposition of the expert. If 
there is no deposition, the plaintiff will have to rebut expert tes-
timony of fault with the settling defendant's expert witness re-
ports or interrogatory responses that were sent to the plaintiff. 
In all likelihood, these reports or interrogatory responses will be 
far less complete and far less compelling than live testimony. 164 
161. For example, see the Pierringer settlement negotiated between the plaintiff 
Alumax and the accounting defendants in Alumax Mill Products, Inc. v. Congress Fi-
nancial Corp., 912 F.2d 996 (8th Cir. 1990), which allowed the plaintiff access to the 
defendants' experts. Brief of Appellee Alumax Mill Products, Addendum Pierringer Set-
tlement Agreement at 7, Alumax Mill Prods., Inc. v. Congress Fin. Corp., 912 F.2d 996 (8th 
Cir. 1990) ("H & Nand McGladrey further agree that Alumax may call, without the 
necessity of a trial subpoena, any witnesses from H & N or McGladrey, or under their 
control, including, but not limited to, H & N's or McGladrey's expert witnesses (at 
Alumax's expense), at trial in this matter."). 
162. The experts are employees of the settling defendant's counsel. As such, their 
work may be protected by the attorney work product doctrine, to the extent it is not 
discoverable pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure. If the expert's opinions are not 
protected by the attorney work product doctrine, the remaining defendant may sub-
poena the expert provided that the remaining defendant is willing to pay the expert's 
regular fees. If the expert is an "in-house" expert-someone whom the settling defend-
ant itself employs-that witness may possibly be classified as a fact witness and then 
subpoenaed as would be any other fact witness. 
163. For example, a product manufacturer will not want to allow plaintiff's counsel 
access to its experts since counsel may later represent another plaintiff with similar 
claims against this same defendant. 
164. Does this matter? Who cares if the plaintiff is unable to rebut testimony about 
the settling defendant's fault? Shouldn't the plaintiff have factored that into the settle-
ment? Perhaps, but remember that the argument for fairness of Pierringerreleases turns 
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Absence of the settling defendant's experts may present a par-
allel problem for the remaining defendants. It is possible that 
the settling defendant developed the best expert testimony 
about the plaintiff's fault. What happens to that testimony? 
Once again, the expert's work may be inaccessible because it is 
protected by the attorney work product doctrine. If the expert 
has been deposed, the remaining defendant can introduce the 
deposition. 165 If not, the remaining defendant can attempt to 
negotiate an agreement with the settling defendant permitting 
the expert to be called at trial.166 Absent this kind of an agree-
ment or a deposition, the jury will never hear the testimony of 
the settling defendant's expert. 
w. Impact of the Loss of Evidence 
As Justice Simonett wrote, "The Pierringer release may place 
the nonsettling tortfeasor at a tactical disadvantage."167 In fact, 
Pierringer releases routinely create tactical disadvantages. Mter 
the release, the normal avenues for proof of the settling defend-
on an assumption that the remaining defendants will pay neither more nor less than 
their fair share of fault. If that is to happen, the jury needs to hear evidence of the 
settling defendant's fault (otherwise the remaining defendants will pay more than their 
fair share) and evidence rebutting the settling defendant's fault (otherwise the remain-
ing defendants will pay less than their fair share). One side of the story is not enough. 
Fairness demands that the jury hear both. 
165. The settling defendant may have fewer strategic objections to permitting a co-
defendant access to an expert opining on the plaintiff's contributory fault. The defend-
ants' interests in proving the plaintiff's fault are aligned prior to a Pierringer settlement. 
Unlike a Mary Carleragreement, the Pierringersettlement will not realign those interests. 
166. Should a plaintiff be able to use a Pierringer settlement to prevent a settling 
defendant's expert from testifying at trial? Suppose that a plaintiff and a defendant 
include a provision in their Pierringer settlement requiring the settling defendant to 
assert the work product doctrine to protect the expert's testimony. Suppose that the 
plaintiff agrees to assume responsibility for the expert's fees-essentially buying the 
benefits of the protecting doctrine from the settling defendant. Whether these types of 
provisions should be enforced ought to depend, at least in part, on when the settlement 
is negotiated. If the remaining defe·ndant has notice of the settlement before the close 
of discovery, that defendant has a fair opportunity to develop its own expert testimony 
about a plaintiff's contributory fault. On the other hand, suppose that the settlement 
occurs during trial, the evening before the remaining defendants expect the settling 
defendant's expert will testifY. The plaintiff and the settling defendant report to the 
trialjudge and the remaining parties that the Pierringeragreement has been signed, and 
that the expert witness-now in the employ of the plaintiff-is on his way to the airport. 
The trial judge has a number of options: declare a mistrial; grant a continuance; go 
forward with trial as if nothing has happened; or recall the expert for deposition or trial 
testimony. Of all the options, the last is best. Plaintiffs and defendants ought not be 
able to collude to hide witnesses. 
167. Simonett, supra note 6, at 21. 
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ant's fault are too often closed. Because of this, juror's inay not 
hear the best-or any-evidence of a settling defendant's fault. 
Justice Simonett concluded that the tactical disadvantages Pier-
ringer releases create do "not taint the release's validity."168 Un-
fortunately, however, this is not always true. When evidence of a 
settling defendant's fault fails to reach the jury, the jury may well 
underestimate the settling defendant's share of fault. Some of 
that fault will be reallocated to the remaining defendant and 
that remaining defendant can no longer be assured that it will 
pay no more than its fair share of fault. The Pierringer promise 
has then been broken. 
3. Problems during Discovery 
The impact that Pierringer releases have on the litigation pro-
cess ripples out from trial. A Pierringer settlement may also have 
a profound effect on discovery. The possibility of a Pierringer set-
tlement will cause cautious defendants to change their discovery 
strategy. Once settlement is a reality, a Pierringer settlement 
changes the way that defendants can conduct discovery. 
a. The Means of Discovery 
Having signed a Pierringer settlement, a settling defendant may 
be dismissed from the litigation. 169 A party has to respond to 
interrogatories, requests for production of documents, and re-
quests for admissions;17o a nonparty does not. Once a settling 
defendant is dismissed from the litigation, it is no longer com-
pelled to respond to these discovery requests. 171 
A settling defendant, however, cannot escape discovery alto-
gether. The remaining parties can still obtain information from 
the settling defendant through depositions and subpoena duces 
168. [d. 
169. See, e.g., Frey v. Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d 918, 922 (Minn. 1978). 
170. See, e.g., MINN. R CIY. P. 33-34 & 36. 
171. Fietzer v. Ford Motor Co., 383 F. Supp. 33,36 (E.D. Wis. 1974). Plaintiff Fietzer 
was injured in an auto accident, entered a Pierringer settlement with the driver of the 
other car, and then sued Ford. Ford filed a third-party complaint against the settling 
driver, who pleaded the release as a defense. Over Ford's objections, the trial judge 
dismissed the settling driver from the suit. [d. at 34. 
If the third-party defendants remain as parties to the suit, they will be subject 
to the more liberal discovery proceedings of a party defendant, and, thus, if 
they are dismissed, Ford contends it will have lost such discovery advantages. 
While Ford's claim of prejudice may have arguable substance, the fact remains 
that the third-party defendants "have bought their peace in any event." 
[d. at 36. 
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tecum.172 However effective they may be, depositions are a more 
narrowly focused mode of discovery. A remaining party may 
have to conduct several depositions to obtain the same breadth 
of information discoverable through a document production or 
a set of interrogatories. Pierringer settlements make discovery 
from a settling defendant more costly and more cumbersome.173 
b. The Ends of Discovery 
Pierringer releases may have yet another effect on discovery 
that is more troubling and more nebulous. The possibility of 
piecemeal settlement creates the need for piecemeal discovery. 
In other words, cautious defendants must recognize and prepare 
for the possibility that a co-defendant may settle prior to trial. 
Settlement means that the remaining defendants will inherit the 
burden, which was previously the plaintiff's, of proving the set-
tling defendant's fault. As such, a defendant must anticipate the 
necessity and conduct the discovery accordingly to prove this 
fault. Since any of the co-defendants may settle before trial, the 
cautious defendant will have to build a case against all other co-
defendants as well as the plaintiff. 
Building a case against all other defendants means discovery 
will be longer and more expensive. It means attorneys will take 
more time crafting theories of co-defendant liability and strate-
gies to prove those theories at trial. It means hiring more ex-
perts. Since every other defendant in the lawsuit will be just as 
cautious, it also means an enormous duplication of effort, time, 
and money. 
The looming possibility of a Pierringer settlement does more, 
however, than multiply the costs of discovery. It also divides the 
defendants. Pierringer settlements make it more difficult for de-
172. See, e.g., MINN. R CIV. P. 30 & 45.04. 
173. See Hefley v. Textron, Inc., 713 F.2d 1487, 1497 (10th Cir. 1983). Hefley in-
volved potential defendants who were not parties to the suit because of a claim of im-
munity, rather than from a Pierringer settlement. The defendant argued it was 
prejudiced because two other potential defendants were not subject to broader party 
discovery. The court noted that discovery from non parties is often more expensive and 
inconvenient. [d. The court refused to permit broader discovery from the immune 
defendants. "A great number of factors, many of them regrettably unrelated to con-
cepts of justice and fairness, influence the assessment of comparative fault. We are not 
convinced that the more generous discovery allowed from parties inevitably would re-
sult in more favorable assessment." [d. at 1497 n.2. The court's reasoning is baftling; 
the court seems to suggest that unfairness in some parts of the tort recovery system may 
be overlooked simply because other parts of the system are also unfair. 
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fendants to follow any kind of unified defense strategy.174 Our 
hypothetical provides an example of this result. In the hypothet-
ical, the bowling alley and the ball-return manufacturer each 
face the very real possibility that they may be responsible for 
proof of the other's fault at trial. Any spirit of cooperation be-
tween the defendants may melt away in the face of this possibil-
ity. For example, it is difficult to cooperate with a co-defendant 
when that co-defendant is asking questions at depositions that 
seem to help the plaintiff. It will also be difficult to cooperate 
with that defendant when planning discovery strategies, and to 
cooperate with that defendant during settlement negotiations. 
In a sense, Pierringer releases have facilitated piecemeal settle-
ments at the expense of universal settlements. 
4. Problems Affecting Settlement 
Smart lawyers realize that Pierringer settlements create tactical 
advantages and disadvantages for the remaining parties. Law-
yers negotiate Pierringer settlements with these considerations in 
mind. Sometimes, in fact, these tactical advantages and disad-
vantages may have more impact on the price paid for settlement 
than on the merits of the claim.175 
Pierringer releases also turn the intuitive logic of settlement on 
its head. Intuition suggests that the more likely it is that a de-
fendant will be liable for a large share of fault, the greater that 
defendant's incentive to settle will be. Intuition also suggests 
that the greater the evidence of a defendant's fault, the greater 
that defendant's incentive to settle will be. These defendants 
may have a strong incentive to settle, but a plaintiff would have 
little incentive to oblige them. When a plaintiff negotiates a Pier-
174. Comparative fault also creates some of this difficulty, since it creates an incen-
tive for defendants to place fault on one another. The Pierringer settlement heightens 
the problem, however, because following a Pierringer settlement a defendant may have 
both the incentive and the sole responsibility for proving a settling co-defendant's fault. 
175. See, e.g., Robert J. Hauer, Jr., Pierringer Releases, DRAFfING SE'ITLEMENT AND RE-
LEASE DOCUMENTS: STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES (MINN. CLE NOTEBOOK) (1989). Mr. 
Hauer posits a hypothetical situation in which plaintiff passenger "A" suffers $35,000 of 
damages while riding with an uninsured motorist. "If you are the attorney representing 
A, your best scenario is to settle A's claim for substantially more than $35,000.00." Id. at 
4. Mr. Hauer then explains how the intersection of law governing Pierringer releases 
and uninsured motorist claims may make this possible. Id. See also John E. Simonett 
(currently Justice Simonett), Indemnity, Contribution and Limited Releases, PRODUCTS LIA-
BILrIY: BEYOND THE BASICS (MINN. CLE NOTEBOOK) 1 (1979) ("The Pierringer release is 
useful in putting the insurer of the nonsettling defendant in a position to settle or risk a 
bad faith excess claim."). 
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ringer settlement with one defendant, the plaintiff hopes that the 
remaining defendants will find little or no evidence of that set-
tling defendant's fault and the jury will apportion little or no 
fault to that settling defendant. 176 In other words, plaintiffs want 
to settle with defendants in a fashion that will create the greatest 
possible tactical disadvantage for the remaining defendants. 
The impact that a Pierringer settlement has on proof at trial is a 
boon to savvy plaintiffs and a snare for the unwary,I77 
Is this really a cause for concern or simply the inevitable reality 
of litigation? After all, it is hardly shocking that settlement in-
volves more than just the merits of the claim. The"impact that a 
Pierringer release has on trial, discovery, and settlement is cause 
for concern, however, for at least two reasons. First, as argued in 
Part IV of this article, our concern may produce tangible bene-
fits. There are realistic solutions to many of the problems that 
Pierringer releases can create. Second, our concern is warranted 
because Pierringer releases were supposed to avoid exactly this 
type of problem. Courts and commentators lauded the Pierringer 
release because it permitted piecemeal settlement without the 
drawbacks of the Mary Carter agreement. Unfortunately, like a 
Mary Carter agreement, the Pierringer release can also distort trial, 
discovery, and settlement. 
IV. ANn You MAy AsK YOURSELF "WELL, How 
DID I GET HERE?" 
Appellate courts have made a promise to nonsettling defend-
ants that, following a Pierringer settlement, they will pay neither 
more nor less than their fair share of fault. 178 If this promise is 
being broken, why are the appellate courts silent? There are two 
easy explanations. First, perhaps the problems Pierringer releases 
may create at trial have not come to the attention of the appel-
176. "Ordinarily, unless the sum paid for the Pierringer is large, plaintiff will be in-
clined to settle only with what appear to be peripheral defendants and keep his cause of 
action against a target defendant." Simonett, supra note 6, at 34. 
177. The unwary plaintiff may settle with a defendant and then learn at trial that it 
has lost access to rebuttal evidence necessary to exonerate the settling defendant. With 
a wealth of accessible discovery available to establish the settling defendant's fault-and 
none available to rebut-the remaining defendants may be able to convince the jury to 
allocate an unfairly large percentage of liability to the settling defendant. In this situa-
tion, the Pierringer promise is broken to the detriment of the plaintiff: the share of fault 
allocated to the remaining defendants will be smaller than it would have been absent a 
settlement. 
178. See part III.A.!. 
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late bench. Second, it may be that appellate courts do not feel 
the broken promise is sufficiently serious to warrant correction. 
Ultimately, neither of these easy explanations seem correct. 
A. "We Had No Idea": Perhaps the Problems are Hidden 
New laws, whether created by the legislature or the judiciary, 
are easier to conceive than to implement. Once enacted and 
applied, new laws are bound to spawn unexpected problems. 
Why should the law creating Pierringer releases be any different? 
Perhaps the problems Pierringer releases pose are especially diffi-
cult to predict. Perhaps the appellate courts were simply unable 
to foresee the practical difficulties of implementing this new 
form of release. This explanation tempts, but ultimately it does 
not persuade. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court gave official approval to Pier-
ringer releases in Frey v. Snelgrove,I79 but these releases were 
hardly new to Minnesota. There is ample evidence that by the 
time Frey was decided in 1978, Pierringer releases had been in 
common use in Minnesota for some time. There is also ample 
evidence that in 1978 the problems that Pierringers could create 
at trial were not only known to the bar, but also known to the 
Frey court itself. 
1. Appellate Familiarity with Pierringer Releases: Minnesota 
Law Before Frey v. Snelgrove 
In 1974, four and one-half years before Frey, the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals applied Minnesota law in Riske v. Truck Insur-
ance Exchange. I8o The Riske court upheld an insured's claim of 
bad faith failure to settle against its insurance carrier. I81 The 
insurer argued that it could not accept the proffered settlement 
because Minnesota law permitted contribution between joint 
tortfeasors, and a covenant not to sue would have exposed its 
policyholder to later claims by the co-defendant. I82 The Eighth 
Circuit rejected this argument: 
179. 269 N.W.2d 918, 923 (Minn. 1978). 
180. 490 F.2d 1079, 1082 (8th Cir. 1974). 
181. Riske, 490 F.2d at 1086. 
182. [d. at 1087. The plaintiffs in Riske were the owner and operator of a snowmo-
bile. An exchange student from Hong Kong, Cynthia Ngan, was injured while riding 
the snowmobile, and subsequently brought suit against the Riskes and the snowmobile 
manufacturer. During trial, Ms. Ngan's attorney made a settlement proposal, and of-
fered to give the Riskes a covenant not to sue if the settlement was accepted. The 
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[I] t appears that a proper type of release could have been 
worked out. In fact, during the trial of this case [insurer's] 
counsel indicated that a proper type of release was known as a 
"Pieninger type release." Therefore, when [the insurer] failed 
to apprise the [policyholder] of the offer, it was impossible for 
them to consult their private attorney in order that he might 
suggest the proper form of release. 183 
The Eighth Circuit did not explain how the policyholder's pri-
vate attorney would be able to opine that a Pierringer release was 
a "proper form of release" without some authority in the jurisdic-
tion permitting use of Pierringers. Nevertheless, Riske demon-
strates that Pieninger releases were at least known and used in 
Minnesota as early as 1970, the date of trial in Riske. 184 
The Frey decision also indicates that the courts were aware that 
Pierringer releases were already used in Minnesota before the de-
cision in that case. According to the supreme court in Frey: 
"The use of a so-called Pierringer release is in accord with Minne-
sota practice and our law of comparative negligence in tort ac-
tions. The bar and trial bench of this state have recently been 
following the procedures set forth in Pierringer v. Hoger."185 Even 
more striking is the fact that none of the parties in Frey-the 
insurer did not tell the Riskes about the settlement offer, claiming that no available 
form of release would have protected its policy-holder. The insurer also argued that it 
would have been unethical to accept the settlement offer because it was contingent 
upon the jury not being told of the settlement. [d. The Eighth Circuit held that the 
insurer's failure to communicate the offer was nonetheless bad faith, because that fail-
ure foreclosed the Riskes "from demanding that [the insurer] secure a ruling from the 
trial judge as to the propriety of such an agreement." [d. The need for this contin-
gency illustrates one of the principal difficulties Pierringer releases were meant to 
eliminate. 
183. [d. 
184. Riske is not the only case predating Frey v. Snelgrove in which a court mentions 
that a Minnesota party may settle with one of several joint tortfeasors by means of a 
Pierringer release. The Minnesota Supreme Court in Nebben v. Kosmalski, 307 Minn. 
211,213 n.l, 239 N.W.2d 234, 236 n.l (1976), notes that the plaintiff settled with one of 
the defendants using a Pierringer release without offering an opinion about the propri-
ety of Pierringer releases. The settling defendant's insurer paid the money remaining on 
the liability policy. A portion of the remaining insurance proceeds were paid to an-
other claimant apparently in consideration of a dismissal with prejudice of that claim-
ant's suit. The remaining insurance proceeds were held by the court until after trial of 
the plaintiff's lawsuit, and then were paid out to the plaintiff apparently pursuant to a 
Pierringer release. Interestingly, the Nebben jury found that neither the settling defend-
ant nor the nonsettling defendant were negligent. [d. at 215, 239 N.W.2d at 237. 
185. Frey, 269 N.W.2d at 921 (citation omitted). See also Simonett, supra note 6, at 3. 
"In recent years, however, the Minnesota trial bar has been using with increasing fre-
quency a simple and ingenious device called the Pierringer release." [d. The Simonett 
article appeared in 1977. 
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plaintiff, the settling defendants, the nonsettling defendant-
felt it was necessary to raise any question about the permissibility 
of Pierringerreleases! To be sure, the plaintiff mentioned in pass-
ing that "whether or not Pierringer v. Hogar [sic] ... will be fol-
lowed in this state remains an open question."186 The 
nonsettling defendant's response to this opening demonstrates 
how widespread the acceptance of Pierringer releases must have 
been at the time: 
Even if one could seriously maintain that this Courl will not be recep-
tive to a Pierringer release, it does not follow that doubts as to 
the enforceability of such agreements entitle a settling de-
fendant to remain a party to an action in the face of a motion 
for dismissal by the non-settling defendant. I87 
Simply put, by the time the Minnesota Supreme Court consid-
ered the issue, Pierringer releases were apparently so widely used 
in Minnesota that it was impossible for lawyers in the state to 
"seriously maintain" that the court would not approve their use. 
2. Appellate Familiarity with the Broken Promise: Appeal of 
. Pierringer-created Problems During Trial 
Frey also introduced Minnesota appellate courts to the 
problems Pierringer releases can create at trial. The issue on ap-
peal in that landmark case was not the validity of Pierringer re-
leases, but the conduct of trial following a Pierringer settlement. 
The Pierringer settlement in Frey occurred during trial. Rather 
than dismissing the settling defendants from the case, the judge 
permitted them to remain at trial. The lawyer for the settling 
186. Brief for Plaintiff-Respondent at 11, Frey v. Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d 918 (Minn. 
1978) (No. 47620). Plaintiff mentioned the fact that the question is undecided, but did 
not raise-much less brief-the issue for the court's consideration. 
187. Reply Brief of Appellant Firestone at 8, Frey (No. 47620) (citation omitted, em-
phasis added). In hindsight, the nonsetding defendant's decision not to challenge the 
permissibility of Pierringer releases was certainly reasonable. The decision not to chal-
lenge the validity of Pierringer releases may have had much to do with the Minnesota 
Supreme Court's then recent decision in Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, 
Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 1977). In that case, the court cites an earlier Minnesota 
case, Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119,64 N.W.2d 159 (1954), to support the proposi-
tion that setdement agreements discharge all parties only if the parties intend the setde-
ment payment to be full compensation for the plaintiffs injuries; if there is only partial 
compensation, the plaintiff may pursue the nonsetding joint tortfeasors. Pacific Indem., 
260 N.W.2d at 558. That language seems to suggest that the court's approval of Pier-
ringer releases was very nearly a foregone conclusion. On the other hand, neither the 
parties nor the court in Frey make reference to this language or the Cronquist case in any 
discussion of Pierringer releases. 
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defendants cross-examined witnesses and delivered a closing ar-
gument following settlement. On appeal, nonsettling defendant 
Firestone argued unsuccessfully that the trial court's failure to 
dismiss the settling defendants deprived Firestone of a fair 
trial. 188 
In addition to its contention that the settling defendants 
should have been dismissed from the case, Firestone presented 
the Frey court with a litany of complaints about the conduct of 
the trial following settlement.189 Firestone's appeal raised many 
of the fundamental questions about the influence Pierringer re-
leases can have on trial and fault allocation: 
1. Firestone complained that evidence of the settling de-
fendant's fault was presented unfairly.19o According to 
Firestone, the plaintiff attempted to rebut evidence of the 
settling defendant's fault. 191 While denying this was a 
188. On appeal, the supreme court suggested that in future cases "the trial court 
should ordinarily dismiss the settling defendant from tlIe case" following a Pierringer 
settlement. Frey, 269 N.W.2d at 923. The requirement is not absolute. "A trial court's 
deviation would not constitute error if those modifications substantially protect the 
rights of all parties and preseIVe the adversary process." [d. With respect to Firestone's 
claim, tlIe court stated, "We have examined the record and find no prejudicial error to 
defendant Firestone." [d. at 922. The court had already ruled, however, that under the 
facts of the case before it, Firestone was precluded from claiming the settling defend-
ants should have been dismissed because Firestone refused to dismiss its own cross-
claims with prejudice. [d. at 921. 
189. Throughout its brief, Firestone attempted to characterize tlIe settlement in Frey 
as a Mary Carter agreement rather than a Pierringerrelease. Brief of Appellant Firestone, 
Frey v. Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d 918 (Minn. 1978) (No. 47620). For example, Firestone 
stated: 
Mary Carter agreements were defined ... as "basically a contract by which one 
co-defendant secretly agrees with the plaintiff that, if such defendant will pro-
ceed to defend himself in court, his own liability will be diminished propor-
tionately by increasing the liability of the other co-defendants." Ward v. Ochoa, 
284 So. 2d 385, 387 (Fla. 1973) .... [A] Mary Carter agreement usually has the 
added elements of secrecy from the jury and continued participation of the 
settling defendant. 
[d. at 20-21. Though not adopted by tlIe supreme court, this characterization was not 
altogether unreasonable. The agreement in Frey provided tlIat any recovery from re-
maining defendant Firestone, up to the amount of tlIe settlement, would be credited to 
the settling defendants. [d. at 6-7. 
190. The plaintiff actually reached a settlement with two defendants. One was the 
owner of the car involved in the accident, and the other was the driver of the car. At 
the close of evidence, the trial judge granted the defendant owner's motion for a di-
rected verdict, and the issue of this defendant's negligence was not submitted to tlIe 
jury. Firestone included this ruling in its bill of errors for its motion for new trial, but 
did not appeal this issue. Appendix to Brief of Appellant Firestone at A-57, Frey (No. 
47620). 
191. Prior to the settlement, the plaintiff had introduced evidence that the settling 
defendant was driving faster than the speed limit. Mter the settlement, Firestone com-
HeinOnline -- 20 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 61 1994
1994] PIERRINGER SETTLEMENTS 
problem at trial in Frey, plaintiff did admit "when a settle-
ment is made, it is true that there may be some motive on 
the part of the parties to slant their testimony-especially 
where the joint conduct of the settling party and the non-
settling defendant combine to cause the accident.,,192 
2. The plaintiff in Frey also mentioned additional problems 
of proof that could arise following a Pierringer settlement. 
If a settling defendant is dismissed, plaintiff argued, "the 
disappearance . . . affords the remaining defendant a 
much clearer field to heap the blame on the now-absent 
party."193 
3. Firestone argued that the settlement unfairly shifted the 
focus of the trial to Firestone's liability. Following settle-
ment, Firestone became the "target" defendant. Fire-
stone complained that the settling parties set them up. 
During closing argument, plaintiffs counsel argued that 
the defective tire had caused the accident and gave, in 
Firestone's words, "a purportedly frank appraisal of a lack 
of responsibility on the part of . . . [the settling 
defendants] .194 
4. Firestone complained that the parties to the settlement 
kept the agreement secret from the court and Firestone, 
hampering Firestone's ability to modifY its trial strategy. 
According to Firestone, "The settlement was no doubt 
verbally entered before ... plaintiffs had introduced a 
substantial portion of their testimony regarding damages 
and before Firestone or the settling defendants even be-
gan presenting their evidence."195 
61 
Firestone raised concerns about the fairness of Pierringer releases 
in three areas: problems of proof, problems of strategy, and 
problems of settlement. Firestone complained in its brief that 
the Pierringer settlement created problems that deprived Fire-
plained, the plaintiff challenged testimony suggesting that the settling defendant was 
speeding at the time of the accident. Brief of Appellant Firestone at 46, Frey (No. 
47620). 
192. Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent at 19, Frey (No. 47620). 
193. [d. at 18. 
194. Brief of Appellant Firestone at 48, Frey v. Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d 918 (Minn. 
1978) (No. 47620). This seems a little disingenuous, doesn't it? Certainly Firestone 
must have understood that the plaintiff would focus on the liability of the large, out-of-
state, corporate manufacturer that did not settle. The point here, however, is not that 
Firestone could have anticipated that its liability would become the principal focus of 
trial; the point is that a Pierringer settlement will inevitably cause some shift of focus, and 
Firestone raised this issue on appeal. 
195. Reply Brief of Appellant Firestone at 12-13, Frey (No. 47620). 
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stone of a fair trial. 196 The Minnesota Supreme Court re-
sponded by approving the use of Pierringer releases in the state, 
but provided only minimal guidance to trial judges concerned 
with the conduct of trial following a Pierringer settlement.197 
B. "It's Not a Problem": Perhaps the Promise is Not Broken 
Appellate courts in Minnesota, Wisconsin, and North Dakota 
have been largely silent about Pierringer-created problems at trial 
and during discovery. Is it possible that the problems simply 
aren't very serious? Again, this is an explanation that, although 
tempting, is ultimately unpersuasive. Though Pierringer releases 
are most prevalent in Minnesota, Wisconsin, and North Dakota, 
they are also used in other jurisdictions. 198 Confronted with Pier-
ringer-created problems of proof and unfairness to the remaining 
parties at trial, appellate courts in one of those other jurisdic-
tions decided to sharply curtail the use of Pierringer releases. 
Maine first formally approved the limited use of Pierringer re-
leases in 1984.199 Since that time, however, the Maine Supreme 
196. Brief of Appellant Firestone at 8-9, Frey (No. 47620). The Frey court declined to 
reach this issue, ruling: "Under the facts of this case, Firestone is precluded from now 
claiming that the trial court should have dismissed all cross<laims and removed the 
settling defendants from the lawsuit." Frey, 269 N.W.2d at 921. Firestone did not appeal 
the jury's finding that the tire was defective, nor did Firestone contest the amount of 
damages the jury awarded. Brief of Appellant Firestone at 46 n.4, Frey (No. 47620). 
Firestone's complaint on appeal was with the jury's allocation of fault. The jury allo-
cated 80% of fault for the accident to Firestone and 20% to the settling defendant 
driver. Plaintiff's counsel argued in closing that the jury should allocate 35% of fault to 
the settling defendant driver. The plaintiff suggested this was evidence of the fairness 
of the trial; Firestone pointed to this as further evidence of the unfairness of the trial. 
Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent at 16; Reply Brief of Appellant Firestone at 15. 
197. The guidance provided may be minimal, but it is still the most complete appel-
late statement about the conduct of trial following a Pieninger release. The absence of 
additional guidance on conduct of litigation following a Pieninger settlement is not so 
much the fault of the Frey decision, but the failure of later appellate courts to complete 
the framework in Frey. Appellate courts in Wisconsin and North Dakota have also 
turned away from Pienin~reated problems, offering little or no guidance to the trial 
court about solution of those problems. See, e.g., Bartels v. City of Williston, 276 N.W.2d 
113, 121 (N.D. 1979); Johnson v. Heintz, 243 N.W.2d 815, 823 (Wis. 1976). See also 
Barlage v. The Place, Inc., 277 N.W.2d 193 (Minn. 1979), in which the court paid only 
scant attention to similar issues concerning the impact of a loan-receipt agreement on 
trial. The appellant's brief, however, offered considerable criticism of the effect of the 
settlement agreement on trial. See Brief of Appellant Firestone at 4-11, Frey (No. 
47620). 
198. See, e.g., Quick v. Crane, 727 P.2d 1187 (Idaho 1986); Gaulden v. Burlington 
No. Inc., 654 P.2d 383 (Kan. 1982). 
199. Thurston v. 3K Kamper Ko., Inc., 482 A2d 837 (Me. 1984). Admittedly, 
Maine's approval of Pieninger releases was limited to a narrow set of circumstances. 
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Court has drastically narrowed the use of Pierringer releases. 
Maine's rationale for retrenchment has been a concern that Pier-
ringer releases create unfairness for the parties remaining at 
trial. 200 
In Lavoie v. Celotex Corp.,201 the Maine court held that a de-
fendant settling pursuant to a Pierringer agreement should not be 
dismissed from the lawsuit if the nonsettling defendant brought 
a cross-claim against the settling defendant and objected to the 
dismissal. 202 The court in Lavoie was concerned that dismissal 
would create problems of proof at trial: "We cannot agree that 
the settlement arrangement has no practical effect on the non-
settling defendant. The practical effect of a non-settling defend-
ant arguing the question of liability in the absence of the settling 
defendant is dependent on the circumstances in each case, and 
cannot be determined in the abstract."203 
Maine subsequently reaffirmed that its statutes usually require 
a verdict be reduced by the dollar amount of any Pierringer settle-
ment. In two separate cases, Maine's supreme court ruled that 
the amount of the Pierringer settlement must be subtracted from 
the verdict if the jury apportioned any fault to the settling de-
fendant or if the trial judge dismissed the settling defendant and 
its fault was not submitted to the jury.204 Each of these decisions 
Maine statutory law provides that a plaintiffs verdict should be reduced by the amount 
of any prior settlement with "persons causing the injury." ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, 
§ 163 (1980). Since the jury did not apportion any fault to the settling defendant in 
Thurston, the court reasoned that the settling defendant was not a person "causing the 
injury," and declined to reduce the verdict by the amount of the settlement. Thurston, 
482 A.2d at 842. 
200. For a post-Thurston critique of the need for Pierringer releases in Maine, see 
John W. Bernotavicz, The Pierringer Question, BAR BULL. (Me. State Bar Ass'n) ,July 1985, 
at 157. 
201. 505 A.2d 481 (Me. 1986). 
202. [d. at 483. 
203. [d. Lavoie effectively put an end to an innovative approach proffered by a fed-
eral judge. In Stacey v. Bangor Punta Corp., 108 F.R.D. 72 (D. Me. 1985), the trial 
judge permitted the nonsettling defendant to choose whether or not to submit the fault 
of the settling defendant to the jury for apportionment. [d. at 76. If the remaining 
defendant chose to submit the fault, then the verdict would be reduced by the percent-
age share of fault. If the remaining defendant chose not to submit the fault, then the 
verdict would be reduced by the dollar amount of the settlement. [d. The passing of 
the Stacey approach is to be mourned, if only because it creates such interesting 
problems of trial strategy. 
204. See Hewitt v. Bahmueller, 584 A.2d 664,666 (Me. 1991); Clockedile v. Town of 
Yarmouth, 520 A.2d 1075, 1077 (Me. 1987). In Hewitt, the nonsettling defendant's 
cross claims against one of the settling defendants were dismissed, so the trial judge did 
not submit that settling defendant's fault to the jury. Hewitt, 584 A.2d at 666. Nonethe-
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further reduced the incentive for parties to use Pierringer releases 
when settling multi-party litigation. 
Maine recently expanded a remaining defendant's right to ob-
ject to dismissal of a settling defendant following a Pierringer 
agreement.205 The court in Petit v. Key Bancshares of Maine206 
held that a trial judge "may not enter a Pierringer order extin-
guishing the contribution claims of a nonsettling defendant, 
whether they are inchoate or asserted in a pending cross-claim, 
over the objection of the nonsettling defendant."207 The Petit 
decision effectively eliminates Pierringer releases in Maine and 
leaves little doubt as to why Maine's supreme court decided to 
write an end to their use of Pierringer releases in that jurisdic-
tion.208 Reviewing the rationale of the Lavoie decision, the Petit 
court wrote, "[W]e were mindful of the distortion of the adver-
sarial relationships that invariably accompames Pierringer 
releases. "209 
Maine chose to eliminate Pierringer releases. Here in Minne-
sota and Wisconsin, at the wellspring of Pierringer releases, that 
decision may seem like an overreaction. The fact remains, how-
ever, that the problems Pierringer releases can create during liti-
gation and trial are serious enough to have convinced one 
appellate court to effectively do away with Pierringer releases 
altogether.210 
C. Well Then, How Did We Get Here? 
As reflected by its decisions, it is clear that Maine's supreme 
court was deeply troubled by Pierringer-created problems of fair-
ness. It is impossible to be certain why appellate courts have not 
offered more guidance about proof of fault following settlement. 
less, the amount of the plaintiff's settlement with that defendant was deducted from the 
verdict. [d. 
205. See Petit v. Key Bancshares of Me., Inc., 614 A.2d 946, 948 (Me. 1992). 
206. [d. 
207. [d. 
208. Neither the plaintiff nor the settling defendant have any incentive to negotiate 
a Pierringer agreement. The plaintiff's verdict will be reduced by the dollar amount of 
the settlement (unless the jury considers the settling defendant's fault and apportions 
zero percent to the settling defendant). The settling defendant will still be required to 
attend trial. 
209. Petit, 614 A.2d at 947. 
210. [d. at 948. If Maine's decision seems like an overreaction, it is also worthwhile 
to remember that the problems that prompted Maine to take this step are not so differ-
ent from the problems that prompted other jurisdictions to ban Mary Carter agree-
ments. See, e.g., Elbaor v; Smith, 845 S.W.2d 240,250 (Tex. 1992). 
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In a dissenting opinion written in 1977, a Wisconsin Supreme 
Court Justice complained: 
... [T] here are difficulties in having the jury allocate fault to 
persons who are not parties. . . . Writers in the field of com-
parative negligence have paid some attention to this problem 
of proof of negligence of multi-tortfeasors some of whom are 
not parties, but courts have been relatively silent. . .. I under-
stand the majority's reluctance to deal with this issue, but we 
must start establishing guidelines for the sake of the bench, 
the bar and the public.211 
Nearly two decades later, it is harder to understand the continu-
ing silence on this issue. Discussion of that silence is necessarily 
speculative. It is speculation that is worthwhile, however, if it 
helps build a fuller understanding of how problems in the law 
can take root and spread. 
1. It's Just a Trial 
Perhaps our appellate courts believe that problems of fairness 
at trial are best left to trial judges. Appellate courts are tradition-
ally reluctant to second-guess the trial process. In theory, our 
system affords the trial judge enormous discretion over the trial 
process. In a sense, appellate courts want no part in the actual 
conduct of trial. 212 Given this division of labor, perhaps it makes 
sense that appellate courts are silent on problems of proof at 
trial. If Pierringer releases create problems at trial, shouldn't cor-
rection of those problems rest with the trial judges? 
At times, however, it seems as if appellate courts are motivated 
by more than simple deference to the trial bench. At times, ap-
pellate courts appear motivated by ~ desire to distance analysis of 
the law from the trial process. We need look no further than 
Pieninger v. Hoger13 itself to find the seeds of this phenomenon: 
The determination of this issue [liability] between the plaintiff 
and the nonsettling defendant does not require the settling 
211. Gross v. Midwest Speedways, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 36, 44 (Wis. 1977) (Abrahamson, 
j., dissenting). Gross did not involve a Pierringer settlement, but Justice Abrahamson 
raised this concern in the context of a discussion about the Pierringer case. Id. at 42. 
212. For example, evidentiary rulings and jury instructions present likely opportuni-
ties for an error of law at trial. If no objection is made at the time of trial, however, an 
erroneous evidentiary ruling or jury instruction will usually not be disturbed on appeal. 
See, e.g., State v. McMorris, 373 N.W.2d 593, (Minn. 1985) (holding that failure to ob-
ject to the trial court's handling ofajury request to review evidence results in forfeiture 
of the right to appeal any error). 
213. 124 N.W.2d 106, 112 (Wis. 1963). 
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defendants to remain parties because the allocation, if any, of 
the causal negligence to the settling tort-feasors is merely a 
part of the mechanics by which the percentage of causal neg-
ligence of the nonsettling tort-feasor is determined.214 
Those mere "mechanics" are known by another name-trial and 
litigation. The work that lawyers, judges, and jurors must do to 
allocate comparative fault both before and during trial is any-
thing but "mere mechanics." Implementation of the law is more 
than a simple, mechanical process. Like it or not, trial, with all 
of its uncertainties and vagaries, is as much a part of our tort 
system as the comparative fault statute.215 
2. Unfairness Works 
There may be another, more troubling explanation for the ap-
pellate silence on this issue. The unfairness of a Pierringer settle-
ment serves the system well. Following a Pierringer settlement, 
particularly at or near trial, the remaining parties may find it 
very difficult to either prove or rebut the fault of the settling 
party.216 Left uncorrected, these difficulties may create an over-
whelming incentive for the remaining party suffering the tactical 
disadvantage to agree to settlement.217 In short, Pierringer re-
leases not only make piecemeal settlement easy, they also make 
214. Id. 
215. For another illustration of this phenomenon, see Hefley v. Textron, Inc., 713 
F.2d 1487 (10th Cir. 1983). That case raised questions about problems of proof and 
discovery that were essentially identical to Piminpcreated problems, though the de-
fendant was missing from the case due to immunity rather than settlement. Private 
Tommy Hefley was injured in a helicopter crash and he sued Textron, the manufac-
turer of the helicopter. Textron, in tum, filed a third-party complaint against the 
United States, among others. The circuit court held that the United States was immune 
from suit, but agreed that its fault should be submitted to the jury anyway, so that re-
maining defendant Textron would be liable only for its own share of fault. So far, so 
good. Textron also requested that the United States not be dismissed as a party so that 
Textron could serve document requests and interrogatories on the government in or-
der to establish that fault. The circuit court balked: 
[T]o any extent that inclusion of the United States as a party would allow more 
extensive discovery, which presumably would provide evidence that would per-
suade the jury to assign a lesser degree of fault to Textron, we conclude that 
the effect on the outcome of the case is trivial. In no event will Textron be 
liable for more than its proportionate share of fault. 
Id. at 1497. The holding here is astonishing, and is tantamount to saying simply "since 
the remaining defendant will pay what it will pay, the result must be fair." Appellate 
courts should not ignore the fact that the process of trial plays a part in determining the 
outcome of a case. 
216. See generaUy discussion in part II.B. supra. 
217. If the fault of the settling defendant will be difficult to prove, then the remain-
ing defendant is the party at a tactical disadvantage. If, on the other hand, the fault of 
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the trial after the settlement very difficult indeed. If trial 
promises to be difficult, the remaining parties will also likely set-
tle. In a system that favors settlement, this incentive is seen as a 
blessing. As one trial judge stated: "The policy of encouraging 
settlement outweighs the prejudice, if any, which the dismissal of 
the settling tort-feasor may occasion to the remaining parties."218 
This concept undermines our notion of judicial process. It is 
simply unjust to permit unfairness to serve as the driving engine 
of settlement. If nothing else, this concept wholly betrays the 
Picrringer promise. Moreover, as argued in the next section, it is 
possible to take simple steps to correct some of the problems 
associated with trial following a Picrringersettlement and still pre-
serve incentives for remaining parties to settle. 
V. INTO THE BLUE AGAIN, Now THAT THE MONEY'S GoNE 
What then is to be done? It can be argued that Picrringer re-
leases do not work, but it cannot be denied that they work better 
than Mary Carter releases or covenants not to sue. Absent funda-
mental revisions in tort law, we seem to be stuck with Picrringer 
releases. Is there some way to fix Picrringer settlements so that 
they no longer undermine the fairness of the litigation and trial 
that may follow settlement? 
A better solution may be to attempt to fix the litigation and 
trial after the Picrringer settlement. In essence, we need to 
reshape postsettlement litigation in a way that protects the non-
settling parties' access to information without jeopardizing the 
settling defendant's need for repose. To strike this balance, we 
will need the help of the trial bench. In cases involving a Pier-
ringer settlement, judges will have to oversee discovery and trial 
to ensure that the jury has a reasonable basis for the apportion-
ment of fault to the settling defendant. This means making mi-
nor changes in the role of the judge, as well as more significant 
changes in the settling defendants' use of discovery, the use of 
expert witnesses, and the conduct of trial. 
the settling defendant is difficult to rebut, then the plaintiff suffers the tactical disad-
vantage. Either way. the Pierringer promise is broken. 
218. Fietzer v. Ford Motor Co .• 383 F. Supp. 33,36 (E.D. Wis. 1974). The court in 
Johnson v. Heintz, 243 N.W.2d 815 (Wis. 1976). said much the same thing: "Unfortu-
nate effects from a viewpoint of trial tactics mayor may not result to the nonsettling 
codefendants. but these incidences do not constitute a legally cognizable bar to the 
release, which is facilitating a policy of reducing litigation and stimulating accord.· [d. 
at 823. 
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A. Early Notice of Settlement 
Without notice of settlement, the court and the remammg 
parties will find it impossible to make the changes during litiga-
tion and trial necessary to enable the jury to fairly allocate the 
fault. Delay in notice can substantially hamper the nonsettling 
defendants' ability to conduct effective discovery and plan for 
trial. Most jurisdictions require parties to a Pieninger settlement 
to notify the court and other parties of the settlement; Minne-
sota requires the court and the other parties to "be immediately 
notified."219 Trial judges need to clarify, however, what "imme-
diate notice" means. 
If the Pieninger settlement occurs during discovery, parties to 
the settlement should be required to notify the court and other 
parties of the settlement within a very short period of time, such 
as three days.22o The remaining defendants need notice of set-
tlement so they can adjust their litigation strategy. During trial, 
however, a delay of three days or even one day may have a 
profound impact since the nonparties may need to alter their 
plans for examination of witnesses. Consequently, if the settle-
ment occurs during trial, the settling parties should be required 
to notify the court and other parties before the next witness testi-
fies. Judges should articulate these standards in their standing 
rules or in the discovery scheduling orders in each civil case. 
Clarifying what is meant by "immediate notice" is not a com-
plete solution. Trial judges need a means to enforce these rules. 
Plaintiffs, in particular, have an incentive to delay notice of a 
settlement since delay-particularly at trial-may create insolu-
ble problems of proof for the remaining defendants.221 More-
219. Frey v. Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d 918, 923 (Minn. 1978). 
220. Three days seems to be the shortest reasonable period for notification of settle-
ment. Because a Pieninger settlement realigns litigation interests, all parties should ide-
ally receive notice of settlement before any other significant development in the 
litigation, such as the taking of additional discovery. For example, five days notice is 
regarded as the minimal reasonable notice in most cases for taking depositions. See 2 
DAVID F. HERR & ROGER S. HAYDOCK, MINNESOTA PRACTICE, CML RULES ANNOTATED 
30.7 (2d ed. 1985). It makes sense to require a shorter period of notice for settlement 
to forestall completion of discovery during the time between settlement and notice. 
221. If a plaintiff hides the fact of settlement until after the close of discovery, it may 
be too late for the remaining defendant to develop the evidence needed to prove the 
fault of the settling party. If a plaintiff hides the fact of a settlement that has occurred 
during trial, the remaining defendants may take a position at trial that would be incon-
sistent with proof of the settling defendant's fault. It is probably impossible to deter-
mine if a significant number of Pieningersettlements are hidden from the court and the 
remaining parties until late in discovery or late in trial. In Frey, it appears that settle-
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over, as discussed below, trial judges can do much to reduce the 
incentive to delay. Judges also need to create disincentives, or 
sanctions, for delay. 
At present, judges have at least two means in their power to 
sanction parties who fail to report a settlement. First, judges 
could refuse to dismiss the settling defendant from the suit if 
notice of the settlement is delayed.222 This would place the onus 
of notification on the settling defendant.223 Second, continuing 
litigation against a party after settlement violates the rule of pro-
fessional responsibility prohibiting a lawyer from asserting a friv-
olous claim.224 Conceivably, ajudge could report a lawyer to the 
Board of Professional Responsibility if the lawyer failed to dis-
close a settlement. 
B. Changes in Postsettlement Discovery 
Many Pierringersettlements occur during discovery, well before 
tria1.225 If settlement occurs during discovery, the trial court can 
easily solve many of the distortions of litigation that the Pierringer 
release might otherwise cause. First, the trial court needs to clar-
ify burdens of proof following the settlement. Second, the trial 
court needs to "capture" available evidence that is apt to evapo-
rate following the Pierringer settlement. Steps to accomplish 
ment was unreported for at least one full trial day. See Brief of Appellant at 6, Firestone, 
Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent Frey at 4, and Brief of Respondents Snelgrove and Ander-
son at IS, Frey (No. 47620). The settlement was signed on Friday, October 31, 1975; 
defendant Firestone received notice of the settlement on either Tuesday, November 4, 
or Wednesday, November 5. 
222. Frey, 269 N.W.2d at 923. Frey provides that, following a Pierringer settlement, 
"[T]he trial court should ordinarily dismiss the settling defendant from the case." Id. 
(emphasis added). If a settlement has been hidden from the remaining defendants, 
requiring the settling defendant to remain a party at trial may be an effective way both 
to punish the delay in notice and to cure Pierringer-<reated problems of trial distortion. 
In this situation, the judge could give the jury notice of the settlement and the new 
alignment of the party's interests. 
223. Settling defendants can bear this burden lightly because they have no incentive 
to hide settlement from the court. 
224. The Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct provide that "[a] lawyer shall not 
bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a 
basis for doing so that is not frivolous .... " MINN. RVLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDver 
Rule 3.1. Additionally, if a trial judge has specifically inquired whether the plaintiff has 
reached settlement, and the lawyers for the settling parties deny settling, then the law-
yers have breached Rule 3.3 of the Professional Rules, which forbids a lawyer from 
knowingly making a false statement of fact to a tribunal. Id. at 3.3(a) (1). 
225. See supra note 150. 
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these goals need to be taken before the settling defendant is dis-
missed from the lawsuit. 
1. Postsettlement Conference 
Once parties give notice of the Pierringer settlement occurring 
during discovery, the court should convene a discovery confer-
ence.226 At this conference, the judge can review the pleadings 
and release, and determine whether or not the settling defend-
ant may be dismissed from the litigation.227 In addition, the 
judge should also determine what discovery has been completed, 
focusing in particular on discovery by the settling defendant and 
its experts. The judge should also signify that the remaining de-
fendants will bear the burden of proving the settling defendant's 
fault.228 
2. Completing Discovery from Settling Defendants 
At the postsettlement conference, the judge should determine 
whether the plaintiff and remaining defendants have completed 
their discovery against the settling defendant. If depositions 
have been completed in the time between the settlement and 
notice of the settlement, the judge should consider allowing the 
remaining defendants to reopen those depositions.229 
226. Ajudge has the discretion to direct attorneys and parties to appear for a confer-
ence for "improving the quality of the trial through more thorough preparation," and 
for "facilitating the settlement of the case." MINN. R. CIV. P. 16.01 (d), (e). Either pur-
pose would appear to justify a post-Pierringer settlement conference. 
227. In most cases, it is appropriate to dismiss the settling defendant. Frey suggests 
that dismissal is appropriate unless "a nonsettling party has cross-claims for both contri-
bution and indemnity, either of which is not covered by the terms of the release .... " 
Frey, 269 N.W.2d at 923. Typically, a Pierringer release provides that the plaintiff indem-
nifies the settling defendant for all claims of indemnity or contribution asserted by the 
remaining defendants. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. But see Alumax Mill 
Prods., Inc. v. Congress Fin. Corp., 912 F.2d 996, 1008 (8th Cir. 1990). Dismissal may 
be inappropriate if the defendants have cross-claims asserting independent causes of 
action against each other. If the court believes that it makes sense to resolve these 
issues during trial of the plaintiffs action, then the court should refuse to dismiss the 
settling defendant. [d. at 1011. 
228. This postsettlement conference should not involve any significant increase in 
the trial judge's workload. At present, settling defendants need to bring a motion for 
dismissal following a Pierringersettlement. Ajudge can conduct the postsettlement con-
ference and, once notified that discovery from the settling defendant is complete, file 
the order dismissing the settling defendant without an additional hearing. 
229. Because the Pierringersettlement realigns parties' interests, fairness may require 
reopening those depositions. Allowing the depositions to be reopened will also help 
eliminate the incentive to delay notice. If there has been a significant delay in notice, 
interrogatories or requests for production may have been completed in the interval 
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If there are pending motions to compel discovery from the 
settling defendant, the judge should decide those motions and 
retain jurisdiction over the settling defendant until the settling 
defendant has complied with the judge's order. If the defendant 
resides outside the court's subpoena power, the judge should in-
quire whether or not the defendant and its fact witnesses have 
agreed to be present for trial. If not, the judge should ensure 
that testimony from these witnesses has been preserved for 
trial.230 
If the plaintiff and remaining defendants have not completed 
document and interrogatory discovery against the settling de-
fendant and its fact witnesses, the judge should retain jurisdic-
tion over the settling defendant. The judge can request a 
motion for expedited discovery to accelerate the time needed to 
complete interrogatory and document discovery.231 Once that 
discovery is complete, the judge can dismiss the settling 
defendant. 
Refusing to dismiss a settling defendant until this discovery is 
complete does diminish the value of settlement. This loss of 
"settlement repose" is slight, however, particularly in light of the 
fact that these changes would make information available to re-
maining parties which they could otherwise obtain only through 
deposition. 
3. Completion of Expert Witness Discovery 
When Pierringer settlements occur early in discovery, before 
parties have designated the experts they will call at trial, there is 
little the judge need do other than remind parties of the change 
in burdens of proof wrought by the Pierringer release. The re-
maining parties are then free to hire experts as they see fit. Like-
wise, there is little a judge need do if the Pierringer settlement 
occurs after all the designated experts have been deposed. For 
better or worse, the remaining parties can rely on the deposition 
transcripts at trial. 232 
between settlement and notice. If so, the court may also want to consider permitting 
additional interrogatories and document production as well. 
230. The judge can either order a videotape deposition of the settling defendant or 
retain jurisdiction over the defendant to mandate the defendant's presence at trial. 
231. MINN. R. CN. P. 33.01 (b), 34.02. Since nonparties may be deposed, there is no 
real need to retain jurisdiction over a settling defendant to facilitate depositions. 
232. A remaining party may be able to make a compelling case that it needs a trial 
deposition of one of the settling defendant's experts or of the plaintiff's expert on the 
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Matters are more complicated when the Pierringer settlement 
occurs after testifying experts have been designated and some or 
all of those experts have yet to be deposed. If this is the case, the 
trial judge needs to look carefully at which experts have been 
deposed and which have not. Pierringer settlements can have a 
profound impact on the availability of four categories of expert 
witness testimony: 
Category One: Experts the settling defendant hired to testify about the 
liability of other defendants. A defendant manufacturer may, for 
example, have hired an expert witness to testify about defects in 
component parts made by another defendant. If the component 
parts manufacturer is still a defendant, the plaintiff will want this 
evidence in front of the jury. If the plaintiff has also settled with 
the component parts manufacturer, the remaining defendants 
will want this testimony in evidence. 
Category Two: Experts the settling defendant hired to testify about the 
plaintiffs fault. The remaining defendants will want this testi-
mony in evidence. 
Category Three: Experts the plaintiff hired to testify about the settling 
defendant'S fault. Following settlement, the plaintiff will have lit-
tle incentive to introduce this evidence, but the remaining de-
fendants will want this evidence to go before the jury. 
Category Four: Experts the settling defendant hired to rebut evidence of 
its own fault. Plaintiffs will want to introduce this evidence to 
minimize the liability of settling defendants. 
Trial courts need to ensure that the jury has a reasonable basis 
on which to assess the fault of a settling party, and at the same 
time take care that no party be permitted to escape its burdens 
of presentation and persuasion. When deciding what to do 
about experts who have been designated to testify, have not been 
deposed, and are likely to "evaporate" following a Pierringer set-
tlement, a trial judge needs to answer two questions. First, do 
the remaining parties have the ability to develop similar expert 
testimony? Second, is it appropriate that they do so? The an-
swers to these questions may depend on the category of the 
expert. 
settling defendant's fault. If the judge believes the discovery deposition of the expert is 
inadequate to convey an expert's opinion to the jury, it would make sense to permit a 
trial deposition of one or more experts prior to dismissal of the settling defendant. 
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a. Categories One and Two: Experts on the Plaintiffs 
Fault and the Remaining Defendants' Fault 
73 
A Pierringer release can realign interests at trial and shift bur-
dens of proof, but it has no impact on the parties' incentives to 
develop this type of expert testimony. A defendant has an incen-
tive to develop expert testimony about the plaintiff's fault both 
before and after a Pierringer settlement. If discovery is still open, 
the remaining defendants have both the ability and the incentive 
to develop their own expert testimony about the plaintiff's fault. 
Likewise, the plaintiff can develop its own testimony about the 
fault of the remaining defendants. Requiring these remaining 
parties to develop this evidence is consistent with those parties' 
burdens of presentation and persuasion. 
If discovery is closed, then the judge has three options. First, 
the judge could order that the settling defendant's experts be 
deposed. Second, the judge could reopen discovery to permit 
alternative experts to be hired. Third, the judge could order the 
parties to proceed to trial without benefit of expert testimony on 
these issues. Unless the remaining parties have some credible 
explanation for their failure to develop this type of expert testi-
mony, this last option is probably best.233 
b. Category Three and Four Experts: Experts establishing or 
rebutting .the settling defendant's fault 
Because a Pierringer settlement will create a new set of incen-
tives concerning proof of the settling defendant's fault, experts 
on the settling defendant's fault present a different situation. It 
makes sense to permit the deposition of these experts, regardless 
of whether or not discovery is still open. For example, prior to a 
Pierringer settlement, a plaintiff has no incentive to develop ex-
pert testimony exonerating the settling defendant. Likewise, a 
nonsettling defendant may have had no reason to develop ex-
pert testimony about the settling defendant's fault. If expert tes-
timony about the settling defendant's fault or lack of fault exists, 
it makes sense to permit discovery of that testimony. Discovery 
of the testimony will provide the jury with the evidence it needs 
to make a reasoned allocation of fault to the settling defendant. 
233. What would a credible excuse be? A remaining defendant might find itself 
without an expert about a certain aspect of the plaintiff's fault because the defendants 
had agreed that the settling defendant would develop expert testimony in this area. 
HeinOnline -- 20 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 74 1994
74 WIUJAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20 
If the plaintiff has hired an expert who, for example, has is-
sued a report opining that the settling defendant is at fault, it 
seems appropriate to permit the remaining defendants to de-
pose that expert. Alternatively, the plaintiff should be allowed to 
depose the expert that the settling defendant hired to testify 
about its own lack of fault. 
C. Settlement during or Shortly before Trial 
When a Pierringer settlement occurs during or shortly before 
trial, it may be more difficult for the judge to solve some of the 
potential problems of unfairness. The Pierringer settlement cre-
ates the same potential problems of unfairness on the eve of trial 
as it does during discovery. Proximity to trial, however, may 
magnify the impact of those problems. The judge must still clar-
ify the changed burdens of proof and capture evidence that is 
likely to evaporate. Unfortunately, a settlement occurring near 
trial limits both the time and the tools available to accomplish 
these goals.234 
1. Conference Concerning the Settlement 
Once notified of the Pierringer settlement, the judge should 
convene lawyers for all of the parties to discuss the settlement. 
The judge could review the Pierringer agreement, and enter its 
terms on the record.235 As with a Pierringer settlement occurring 
during discovery, the judge could then discuss with the parties 
the realigned burdens of proof. The plaintiff and remaining de-
fendants should disclose the witnesses that they plan to call to 
prove and rebut the settling defendant's fault. The trial judge 
could review this proposed evidence to determine whether steps 
need to be taken to capture evidence that is in danger of "evapo-
rating." Arrangements can be made at this conference concern-
ing the testimony of the settling defendant.236 
234. When a Pieningersettlement occurs just before trial, there may be cases when it 
makes sense to grant a continuance to reopen discovery-perhaps to give the remain-
ing defendants an opportunity to depose critical experts who now will not be available 
to testify. In most cases, if the Pieninger settlement is negotiated just before trial, it will 
make sense to give the remaining parties at least a half-day to restructure their trial 
strategy. 
235. See, e.g., Frey v. Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d 918,923 (Minn. 1978). 
236. The settling defendant will presumably be present in court, and in any event, 
has not yet been dismissed from the lawsuit. If necessary, the remaining party desiring 
the settling defendant's testimony can serve a subpoena. If appearance later at trial will 
work a substantial hardship on the settling defendant, the trial court may consider or-
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2. Preventing "Evaporation" of Evidence 
When a Pierringer release is signed at or near trial, a judge will 
have the opportunity to preserve the testimony of the settling 
defendant through subpoena or deposition. The evidence most 
in danger of "evaporating" after the Pieninger settlement is ex-
pert testimony.237 As is the case with Pieningersettlement during 
discovery, there are four categories of expert evidence at issue. 
It is important that the jury hear any existing testimony from 
Category Three and Four experts-the experts establishing or 
rebutting the settling defendant's fault. 238 The parties wishing 
to proffer this testimony will not have had an incentive to de-
velop this evidence themselves prior to the Pieninger release. For 
that reason, the judge may need to take all reasonable steps to 
capture existing testimony from the plaintiff's expert on the set-
tling defendant's fault and the settling defendant's own rebuttal 
expert. If these experts are not available to testify by subpoena, 
the court should permit free use of their depositions at trial. If 
these experts have not been deposed or their depositions are 
inadequate, the trial judge should consider recessing trial to per-
mit video depositions of these experts.239 
Judges should also consider using this same approach to ex-
perts in Categories One and Two-the settling defendant's ex-
perts on the fault of the remaining defendants and on the fault 
of the plaintiff. If the remaining parties do not have other simi-
lar expert witnesses available to testify, the judge should take rea-
sonable steps to insure that the jury hears the testimony of these 
experts as well. It is true that the remaining parties, both plain-
tiff and defendant, had the opportunity and incentive to develop 
dering the video deposition of the settling defendant or taking the settling defendant's 
testimony out of order. This last option might be helpful in circumstances where the 
jury would not otherwise hear the settling defendant's testimony until late in the trial. 
237. Other evidence, such as documentary evidence of the settling defendant's fault, 
will presumably have been produced for all parties during discovery. If settlement oc-
curs at trial or on the eve of trial, that evidence may already be marked and ready for 
introduction. 
238. In some types of cases, professional malpractice actions for example, expert 
testimony on the fault of the settling defendant will be required before the jury can 
deliberate about that defendant's fault. See, e.g., Reinhardt v. Colton, 337 N.W.2d 88, 95 
(Minn. 1983). 
239. If this is impractical, the court should permit free use of expert reports and 
interrogatory responses at trial. These are poor substitutes for depositions, however, 
and place the party forced to rely on this "second-best" evidence at an unfair tactical 
disadvantage. 
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this evidence themselves during discovery. If they have sUIvived 
summary judgment, however, and relied on the availability of 
the settling defendant's experts at trial, then it seems only fair to 
do what can be done to capture this evidence.24o 
Finally, as a practical matter, judges should allow the remain-
ing parties free use at trial of depositions of settling parties and 
witnesses in a settling party's control-both fact and expert wit-
nesses. The Rules of Civil Procedure permit "an adverse party" 
to use "the deposition of a party ... for any purpose."241 Trial 
courts should read "the deposition of a party" to include deposi-
tions of any person who was once a party to the lawsuit, but since 
has settled. Trial courts should also read "adverse party" 
broadly. For purposes of using the deposition of a settling de-
fendant, both the plaintiff and the nonsettling defendants 
should be defined as "adverse" parties.242 Free use of these dep-
ositions balances the requirement of fair fault allocation with the 
settling defendant's desire for repose. Use of depositions in-
creases the jury's ability to assess fault of the settling defendants 
and may decrease the need to have those defendants-and all 
their witnesses-appear at trial to testify. 
240. This argument may seem reasonable with respect to the remaining defendants, 
and less so with respect to the plaintiff. On the other hand, blocking a plaintifFs access 
to a defendant's experts following settlement will only discourage the plaintiff from 
settling with that defendant. This disincentive occurs because the plaintiff would then 
find it difficult to prove the settling defendant was not at fault. For a general discussion 
of the problems associated with proving fault, see supra part II.B.2. 
241. MINN. R. Cry. P. 32.01 (b). 
242. Free use of these depositions also requires some thinking about Rule 32.02, 
which governs objections to admissibility of deposition testimony at trial. MINN. R. Cry. 
P. 32.02. The rule preserves objections to admissibility "for any reason which would 
require the exclusion of evidence if the witness were then present and testifYing." [d. 
Practically speaking, this means that objections to form or foundation are waived unless 
made at the time of the deposition. Objections to leading questions present a problem. 
Federal Rule of Evidence 611 (c) permits a party to use leading questions when interro-
gating an adverse party or a witness identified with an adverse party. FED. R. EVID. 
611 (c). Trial courts should read this rule's use of "adverse party" broadly, as well. Com-
parative fault and the possibility of a Pierringer settlement mean that any other party is 
potentially an "adverse party." Trying to figure out whether a settling defendant was an 
adverse party during the deposition or is an adverse party at trial is tricky and probably 
pointless. Trial courts should permit both plaintiff and remaining defendants to use 
the deposition of a settling defendant as if that defendant were an adverse party, and 
should overrule any objections made in the deposition that the question posed was 
leading. 
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3. Explanation of the Settlement to the Jury 
As Justice Simonett wrote, "the jury should be entitled to know 
there has been a settlement and release if for no other reason 
than to explain the settling tortfeasor's conspicuous absence 
from the court room."243 At trial, judges need to take care that 
the evidence about a settling party's fault can be presented to 
the jury in a fashion the jury can understand. During the begin-
ning of trial, the judge should explain that the plaintiff has set-
tled with one of the defendants.244 If counsel for the remaining 
parties fails to do so during opening statement, the judge may 
need to make a brief statement identifying the settling defend-
ant and explaining that the jury will also need to assess the fault 
of this defendant.245 
Prior to the close of the remaining defendant's case, the judge 
should assure that the remaining defendant has had an opportu-
nity to present evidence of the settling defendant's negligence. 
Similarly, the judge should also assure that the plaintiff has had 
an opportunity to rebut that evidence. Finally, the judge should 
instruct the jury about assessing the settling defendant's fault, 
and include that settling defendant with the other parties listed 
in the apportionment question on the special verdict form.246 
243. Simonett, supra note 6, at 30, quoted with approval in Frey v. Snelgrove, 269 
N.W.2d 918, 923 (Minn. 1978). As Simonett also notes, the fact of the settlement is also 
admissible to demonstrate the bias of a witness. [d. at 30-31; see also Johnson v. Heintz, 
243 N.W.2d 815, 825 (Wis. 1976) (stating the trial court should have allowed the intro-
duction of the fact of settlement to prove bias). 
244. There is no need to disclose the amount of the settlement to the jury. It is 
irrelevant. Frey, 269 N.W.2d at 923 ("[A]s a general rule the amount paid in settlement 
should never be submitted."). For a complete discussion of this issue, see Simonett, 
supra note 6, at 31-33. 
245. See, e.g., Minn. Dist. Judges Ass'n, 4 Minn. Practice, MINN. JURY INSTRUCTION 
GUIDES, Civil JIG 148-49 (3d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1992) (suggesting a jury instruction re-
garding the settling defendant's absence). The judge may also wish to explain how the 
settlement has realigned the interests of the remaining parties. This can be done sim-
ply: "Members of the jury, the remaining defendant will try to convince you that the 
settling defendant is at fault for the plaintiff's damages. The plaintiff will try to con-
vince you that the settling defendant is not at fault, and that the fault of the remaining 
defendant caused plaintiff's damages." 
246. Of course, if the remaining parties fail to present sufficient evidence of the 
settling defendant's fault, then the judge can direct a verdict in favor of the settling 
defendant and strike its name from the apportionment question. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Will these changes make trial easier following a Pitminger set-
tlement? They may. Then won't these changes undermine the 
remaining parties' incentive to settle? They will not. Rather, 
these changes will balance the remaining parties' incentive to 
settle. At present, Pitminger-created problems of fairness may 
place one of the remaining parties at an enormous tactical disad-
vantage.247 When this happens, the disadvantaged party has a 
tremendous incentive to settle. However, as great as that incen-
tive to settle might be, it is no greater than the opposing party's 
incentive to press its advantage and proceed to trial. If the 
changes proposed here eliminate some of the Pitminger-created 
tactical disadvantages, they may actually help to increase the in-
centive to settle. 
Will these changes eliminate Pitminger-created problems of un-
fairness? Undoubtedly not, but they may help. Within ethical 
limits, nothing can or should prevent imaginative trial lawyers 
from finding seams in the fabric of law and using those seams to 
their client's advantage. The changes suggested here may help 
correct some of the problems that Pitminger releases have cre-
ated. More important, we should incorporate the processes of 
discovery, litigation, and trial into our thinking and writing 
about law. These processes are the inherent and inevitable con-
text in which our notions of law must be played out and proved. 
If we are to understand new ideas about law, we must under-
stand how those ideas will influence litigation and trial and how, 
in turn, litigation and trial will shape the application of our 
ideas. 
This awareness of the effect of litigation and trial-and of 
their context-has never figured significantly in writings about 
Pitminger releases. The problems with Pitminger releases are, in a 
very real sense, the expected residue of the willingness to dismiss 
allocation of fault to settling defendants as "merely a part of the 
mechanics by which the ... negligence of the nonsettling tort-
feasor is determined. "248 Litigation and trial are anything but 
"mere mechanics." Trial is the proving ground for Pitminger re-
leases; trial is where Pitminger releases must sink or swim. 
247. In many cases, the remaining party with the greatest tactical disadvantage will 
be the remaining defendant. As argued in Section II, however, the disadvantage may 
sometimes be the plaintiff's. 
248. Pierringer v. Hoger, 124 N.W.2d 106, 112 (Wis. 1963). 
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The guidance given to the trial bench and bar about Pierringer 
releases has been drained of almost any reference to the context 
in which those releases must be used. On the parched page of 
the appellate opinion, Pierringer releases seem to work very well 
indeed. However, immersed in the fluid environment of the 
courtroom, Peirringer releases too often sink. We should not 
have expected more. We forgot to mention the water. 
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